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C H A P T E R  1  
 
“ O n  t h e  f a r  s i d e  o f  l a n g u a g e ”  
 
A n  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
 
 
 
 
C O G N I T I V E  L I T E R A R Y  T H E O R Y  
 
Suspended somewhere between art and science, in a metaphorical juncture between 
the left-brain and the right-brain, there is a little-known discourse spiriting its way into English 
and Literature Departments around the world: cognitive literary theory.  Cognitive literary 
theory is a new approach to literature which appears to be “gaining the force of an imperative in 
academia.”1  It is the quintessential interdisciplinary study, bridging gaps between literature and 
“linguistics, computer science, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy of mind and 
anthropology.”2
This is not to suggest that cognitive literary theory is a polarized exchange between the 
humanities and the sciences—where only one stands to gain from the relationship; this is a two-
way exchange.  Cognitive studies have as much to learn from the study of literature as literary 
studies have from cognitive theory.  Some current theorists, like Patrick Colm Hogan, 
  It ventures to answer those overwhelming questions at the very heart of 
literary study: how and why do we read?  What is it that has kept us and our ancestors for 
thousands of years returning to the narrative?  To answer these questions, the literary scholar 
must turn to her colleagues in the social and natural sciences; she must seek out the answers in 
the peculiar machinery of the mind.   
3 use the 
study of literature as evidence to bolster theories of cognition; indeed some theorists, like Mark 
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Turner, George Lakhoff, and Mark Johnson, suggest that the entire cognitive power of the brain 
functions in a form of narrative interpretation and in terms of literary discourse.4, 5  However, 
other theorists like Mary Crane,6
Unlike cognitive sciences, which take the brain as their focus of study and which 
often use formal languages (such as mathematics or computer ‘languages’) to 
describe them, the text-based theorists… study the literary and cultural 
productions of the mind and use recognizably literary discourse to interpret 
them.
 use current cognitive theories to offer new insights into 
literature; this is the moment in research where literary scholars can revel in the work done by 
their scientific colleagues and adapt it to suit the needs of their humanistic colleagues.  Mary 
Crane calls them text-based theorists: 
7
 
 
This project will approach the study of literature primarily from this point of view, using 
cognitive theories to explore in new ways the question of how we read and write.  The specific 
theories used in each chapter will be explained in context as they pertain to the literary analysis.  
However, this project will approach a branch of literature which has, as of yet, only a small 
scope of critical analysis and which merits further study.  This is a branch of literature which is 
on “the far side of language”8
 
—when language alone is not enough to capture the visceral and 
variegated nature of human experience.   This is the 9th art, the comic book, or the graphic 
narrative. 
T H E  G R A P H I C  N A R R A T I V E  
 
The graphic narrative as a genre has been elusory since its inception, changing 
nomenclature and definition with each generation of authors and critics.    Some refer to the 
genre as “comics,” others “graphic novels.”  The most recent generation of theorists, however, 
have adopted the term “graphic narrative” to encompass all subgenres of the form—fiction and 
nonfiction alike (although any name can be interchanged for the others without serious qualm 
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at this point in the development of its scholarship).  In 1993 Scott McCloud, the pioneer of 
comics criticism, first defined comics as “[j]uxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate 
sequence, intended to convey information and/or produce an aesthetic response in the 
viewer.”9
It seems to me that the essential characteristic of ‘comics’—the thing that 
distinguishes it from other kinds of pictorial narratives—is the incorporation of 
verbal content.... And the history of cartooning—of ‘comics’—seems to me 
more supportive of my contention than [McCloud’s].
  However, this definition might include works of art like the Bayeux tapestry and Andy 
Warhol’s “Campbell’s Soup Cans” that clearly do not fall under the same category as the The 
Adventures of Tintin.  So in 2001, Robert Harvey suggested a new definition: 
10
 
 
In 2008, Hillary chute offered her own definition which did not constrain it only to the 
relationship between text and image, but also incorporated its narrative structure: a formal 
system of dually presenting time and space.  The following definition, if not in so many words, 
has been the reigning one in current scholarship: 
Comics might be defined as a hybrid word-and-image form in which two 
narrative tracks, one verbal and one visual, register temporality spatially.  
Comics moves forward in time through the space of the page, through its 
progressive counterpoint of presence and absence: packed panels (also called 
frames) alternating with gutters (empty space).  Highly textured in its narrative 
scaffolding, comics doesn’t blend the visual and the verbal—or use one simply 
to illustrate the other—but is rather prone to present the two 
nonsynchronously…11
 
 
Historically, the comic book has been considered a frivolous medium for the mass 
consumption of popular culture—from penny-dreadfuls to gag cartoons to superhero, romance, 
and mystery comics.  Whether it was considered frivolous because it was popular, or whether it 
was popular because it was frivolous is a debate still raging amongst cultural theorists and 
historians.12  Even still, modern culture stigmatizes it as “infantile, vulgar, or insignificant.”13  
Within the last few decades, however, the graphic narrative has felt a dramatic shift in mood 
and content.  Art Spiegelman has been the unofficial herald (at least in the United States) for the 
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shift when his graphic narrative Maus—a two-part story about the multigenerational trauma of 
Holocaust survivors and their families—won a Pulitzer Prize Special Award in 1992.  Author-
artists like Spiegelman, Joe Sacco, and Marjane Satrapi have transformed the medium into a 
powerful cultural force for examining historical traumas and the personal experiences born 
within them.   Artists like these are evidence for the power of the graphic narrative medium.  
The fact remains that artists like Spiegelman, Sacco, Satrapi and many others did not choose any 
other form to express their stories, though they had a wide range of mediums from which to 
choose—the novel, the short story, the canvas, the stage, etc.  There was something which drew 
these people to the graphic narrative for expression—something which neither visual art nor 
language could have done alone. 
The graphic narrative capitalizes on its unique treatment of the convergence of word 
and image which rests on the premise that word and image live in a symbiotic relationship with 
each other.  Even the prototype of the comic strip—drawings done by Swiss artist Rodolphe 
Töpffer as early as 1827—stressed the important relationship between text and image.  As a 
theorist, himself, Töpffer wrote, “The drawings without their text would have only a vague 
meaning; the text without the drawings, would have no meaning at all.  The combination of the 
two makes a kind of novel.”14
 
  The graphic narrative medium is one whose gravitational 
center—the point from which everything originates, finds its ground, and stretches into infinite 
possibility—is the relationship between processing visual and linguistic signs of communication 
to one end.  This is the cognitive juncture of word and image. 
T E X T ,  I M A G E ,  A N D  T H E  M I N D  
 
Noam Chomsky’s theory of a Universal Grammar changed the way the world perceived 
language and human nature.  His theory submits that each human being is biologically equipped 
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with the capacity to understand, produce, and manipulate language.  The tremendous impact of 
his theory on cognitive processes shifted the scholarly focus of human cognition to linguistic 
processes.  Evolutionary biologists believe the human capacity for language—what Chomsky 
calls the Language Acquisition Device (LAD)—coevolved with the development of the prefrontal 
cortex.15  As a result of the development of the prefrontal cortex, increased encephalization—
the development of brain mass—led to increased human intelligence, all of which unfolded 
simultaneously with the development of human language.16  Thus, scholars regularly attribute 
the basis of human intelligence with our unique capacity for language.   Certainly this cognitive 
development was a crucial one in human evolutionary history.  Some evolutionary biologists like 
Stephen Jay Gould, however, go so far as to claim that “speech (or writing) is the quintessential 
act of human mind… the centerpiece of our evolutionary distinctiveness from all other 
creatures.”17
Yet the human cognitive capacity for communication extends beyond language.  Allen 
Paivio writes, 
   
[L]anguage never worked its magic alone and it cannot do so now.  Instead, it 
was always dependent on a silent partner that provides it with something to talk 
about, a general cognitive system that had evolved to a high level before it 
invited language in as a coplayer in the evolutionary scene.18
 
 
The basis for human cognition—the silent partner in language’s crusade for communication—is 
rooted in sensory input.  Before communication commences in sensory output—for example, 
the aural stimuli in speech or the visual stimuli in writing—an external stimulus must first be 
received and processed by one or more of the senses.  Paivio continues, 
I see language as a benevolent, octopus-like parasite whose tentacles invaded 
the brain and was empowered by it to survive and thrive to the point where it 
could contribute something useful to its host. 
 
The general cognitive system on which language thrives is knowledge acquired through sensory 
experience. 
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Mark Sadoski and Allan Paivio suggest that all “external experiences are perceived 
through the stimulation of our various sense modalities, including the visual, auditory, haptic, 
gustatory, and olfactory sense modalities.”19  Through the Dual Coding Theory of literacy, they 
argue that verbal and non-verbal processes—which include all non-linguistic sensory 
experiences—exist on equal cognitive planes.  Their theory offers a unified approach to human 
literacy which takes into account the “two great symbolic systems of cognition: language and 
mental imagery,”20
For Ellen Spolsky and other cognitive theorists, the visual sense modality takes 
precedent over other sensory experiences as an effective aid in human communication.  Ellen 
Spolsky argues that human beings have a cognitive hunger for images—that it is our primordial 
affectation to hunt and gather visual stimuli in order to survive.  Our overwhelming desire to 
feed our visual sense modality is iconotropism.  She writes 
 where language is stored as verbal processes and mental imagery is derived 
from various perceptions in our sense modalities.  Through associative processing (within the 
verbal system or within the non-verbal system) and referential processing (between the verbal 
and non-verbal systems), the verbal and nonverbal modalities work together to form the basis 
for human cognition. 
Iconotropism, then… hypothesiz[es] that human beings feed on pictures, 
metabolize them—turn them into nourishment—because we need the 
knowledge they provide.  We turn toward pictures when they are available, we 
imagine them if they’re not, and we produce them if we can.21
 
 
Just as Chomsky proposed human beings developed an innate language faculty to understand, 
process, and manipulate language, Spolsky suggests that human beings are cognitively equipped 
to do the same with images.  While evolutionary biologists argue the development of language 
was a crucial evolutionary survival tactic, Spolsky suggests that iconotropism was a much earlier, 
equally important evolutionary development. 
A n  I n t r o d u c t i o n | 9 
Most theorists can agree that cognition is not restricted to either verbal processes or 
non-verbal processes and that each set of processes operates differently.  Each process affects 
different ways of knowing.  In particular, the debate over the competing cognitive functions of 
text and image—“the imagistic and the concrete” versus “the verbal and the abstract”22—has 
raged on for centuries, pitting one against the other.  Yet iconotropism suggests that there is as 
much a need to represent the experienced world physically as linguistically.  Some argue that 
the demand for images may even surpass the demand for verbal communication.  Spolsky 
writes, “The interesting point for us is the idea of the gradient: some problems require more 
[visual] representation than others.”23
Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis is just such a text, a graphic memoir about the author’s 
experience growing up during the Iranian Revolution.  The narrative explores the life of Marji, a 
young girl exposed to the horrors and complexities of mass violence and tyranny.  It traces her 
mental torment of grappling with extremist ideologies in the Shah’s Iran, a subsequent sojourn 
to Austria as a political refugee, and her return to Iran as a transnational in the new Islamic 
Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini.  “I give myself this duty of witnessing,” Satrapi explains.
  Typically these moments arise out of a need to specially 
process significant cultural, historical, or emotional stimuli.  Of considerable interest, then, is the 
new wave of graphic narratives which combine both nonverbal and verbal (or linguistic) lines of 
narration in order to work through these types of cognitively demanding issues. 
24  It 
is a two-fold duty: to be a witness to the cultural situation of modern-day Iran—to experience 
first-hand—but also to bear witness and relinquish to others a vicarious experience.  She 
charges herself to bear the burden of the senses as a witness who sees, hears, feels, and 
touches history.  Contingent on that burden is the duty to communicate her experience through 
narration.  The consummation of verbal narration and sensual experience—a meeting of word 
and embodiment—sires a multimodal cognitive experience.  Persepolis is a project which at 
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once recalls and reimagines a history such that it is not only remembered but reenacted through 
images on a page.  Satrapi’s version of witnessing transforms typical autobiography into the 
graphic novel: the hybrid autobio-graphic novel with two lines of narration, the visual and the 
verbal.  Persepolis will be our point of entrance into the combined study of the graphic narrative 
and cognitive literary theory. 
 
A N  O V E R V I E W  F O R  W H A T  F O L L O W S  
 
 The purpose of this project is to examine how text and image function cognitively in the 
graphic narrative paying particular attention to its manifestation in Satrapi’s Persepolis.  The 
structure is such that each chapter will progressively become more specific, from medium to 
genre to text, drawing on specific examples from Persepolis for support.  Chapter 2 will first 
categorize the various relationships between text and image as they function in the graphic 
narrative as a medium.  They are described in terms of the reader’s cognitive experience of the 
verbal narrative line’s juxtaposition against the visual narrative line.  Chapter 3 will examine how 
a multimodal narrative—a dual verbal/visual narrative—affects the genre of nonfiction in the 
graphic narrative medium.  It will define not only the tensions that text and image necessarily 
bring to the authenticity of nonfiction, but also the benefits.  Chapter 4 will focus on Persepolis 
as a cognitive product in its own right.  Stemming from theories of autobiography which suggest 
that an autobiographic text is a self-construction or self-understanding of identity, one can 
examine Persepolis as a material product and personal construction through this lens.  Consider 
the competing cultural influences which manifest themselves in Persepolis because they 
manifest themselves in Marjane Satrapi’s own transnational identity: the Persian, the Islamic, 
the Modern Iranian, the Western.  I offer a cognitive approach which suggests that Persepolis 
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functions as a material anchor of a conceptual blend—cognitive theories developed by Mark 
Turner, Gilles Fauconnier, and Edward Hutchins which are further explained in Chapters 2 and 4. 
 While the primary goal of this project is specific to the research goals explained above, 
the secondary goal is advocacy.  Both cognitive literary theory and comics criticism are 
marginalized in current literary studies.  The former—whose scientific method looms over 
literature—threatens to overshadow the beauty and philosophy behind prose and poetry, while 
the latter—as a product of mass consumption and popular culture—threatens to undermine the 
legitimacy of literature.  However, this project will show the viability of both cognitive literary 
theory as a method and the graphic narrative as a subject for serious academic inquiry. 
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C H A P T E R  2  
 
“ U n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  l a s t  b l a c k s m i t h s ”  
 
V e r b a l  a n d  V i s u a l  
N a r r a t i v e  L i n e s  E x p l a i n e d  
 
 
 
 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
 The graphic narrative as a medium solicits a multimodal cognitive experience because of 
its dual form.  It offers both a verbal narrative line—the text—and a visual narrative line—the 
image.  The simultaneous presentation of two lines of narration will induce a multiplicity of 
cognitive experiences.  The multimodal presentation will give rise to moments of enhanced 
understanding and moments of great tension.  These two lines of narration provide two ways of 
reading, two ways of learning.  Ellen Spolsky muses over the need for such juxtaposition as she 
writes, “Together the texts and the pictures ask whether we learn different things by hearing a 
story than by seeing and by touching.”1
 
  She suggests that text and image each play a different 
role in the narrative process; when the two come together in varying degrees, it results in 
distinctive cognitive experiences neither present in visual narration nor verbal narration alone.  
A productive friction between the two lines of narration results in new kinds of reading-viewing 
experiences.  The cognitive experiences induced by the dual verbal/visual narrative lines can be 
categorized into three major experiences: the illustrative experience, the convergent 
experience, and the divergent experience.  Each experience has a unique relationship between 
text and image which affects the way the reader cognizes the narrative as a whole. 
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T H E  I L L U S T R A T I V E  E X P E R I E N C E  
 
The illustrative experience is elicited from a mirror presentation of the verbal and visual 
narrative lines.  One line of narration illustrates the other, producing one continuous, integrated 
experience, like an illustrated instruction manual for instance.  Information is overcoded in both 
verbal and non-verbal cognition (i.e. visual, haptic, or other sensorial processes).  The goal of 
overcoding is to use multiple, overlapping modes of cognition to guarantee accuracy of 
transmission.  It is used only when the audience is at risk of being disengaged with the flow of 
visual information or linguistic narration alone.  An additional mode of narration supplements 
the original mode to act as guarantor of information communication. 
Consider the sportscaster who converts visual information into verbal information so 
the audience can understand the game play.  Vin Scully, sixty-year sportscaster for the Brooklyn 
and Los Angeles Dodgers, watched the final game of the 1986 World Series and described the 
action in the last few moments, “There’s a little roller up along first, behind the bag!  It gets 
through Buckner!  Here comes Knight and the Mets win it!”2  Contra, consider the 
choreographer who might follow up a complicated call—“On the third beat you need to move 
quickly: one, two, kick, turn.  Down, up, kick, turn”—with a kinetic demonstration.  Both the 
sportscaster and the choreographer guide their audience to understand information in one 
mode through mirrored information presented in another mode: the sportscaster added a 
verbal narrative line to the visual experience of game play; the choreographer added a kinetic or 
visual line to verbal instruction.  Each provided congruent pieces of information in separate 
modes to create one continuous, hybrid narrative.  The goal is to be sure that the audience can 
follow a real-time experience from moment to moment, particularly at times when they might 
be jarred by a moment of cognitive difficulty. 
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The difference between the illustrative experience in the previous examples and the 
illustrative experience in the graphic narrative is its sustained elaboration.  Whereas the former 
is a temporary lapse into illustrative experience, the latter is an entire project.  In real-time 
narration, the illustrative experience overcodes information when, for example, the 
choreographer finds the original mode of instruction insufficient to fully communicate the 
intentions of an 8- or 16-count sequence.  On the other hand, the target element for the graphic 
narrative is the not one episode of the narrative, but the majority of the project.  The moment 
of cognitive difficulty is the entire narrative development.   
The illustrative experience has become the default mode of cognition in the graphic 
narrative in part because of its history.  From the mid-1800s to the 1920s, most cartoonists were 
only using images to literally illustrate the text.  At times, captions to illustrations could be two 
to three paragraphs in length, leading long-time cartoon editor of the New Yorker, Lee Lorenz, to 
dub them “illustrated anecdotes.”3  Here, pictures were not used to tell the story but only to 
overcode the text.  Gradually, cartoonists refined their technique of incorporating the visual 
narrative line into the verbal narrative line, minimalizing the use of captions and dialogue and 
letting the image deliver the punch line, so to speak, in an “economy of expression.”4
The mirrored lines of narration offer stability to a medium ripe with tensions.  To 
compensate for the cognitive difficulty of a multimodal narrative, the graphic novelist defaults 
his narrative to the illustrative experience.  It provides basic structure to the narrative and 
overcodes information to guarantee the reader can follow the narrative action.  As a structuring 
agent, the illustrative experience first develops the simple narrative action, introduces the 
“visual lexicon,” and provides thematic structure. 
  The visual 
line would continue to develop into a stable, independent narrative force, but the graphic 
novelist would always return to the simplicity of the illustrative experience. 
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A .  D E V E L O P I N G  N A R R A T I V E  A C T I O N  
As explained above, the illustrative experience is suited for narrative action because it 
overcodes information fundamental to narrative development.  “Fundamental,” here, does not 
refer to that which is at the ‘root or heart of the matter,’ but that which is a foundation for the 
narrative.  Most instances of illustrative experience do not relate to what may be at the ‘heart’ 
of the narrative, the gritty emotional elements.  Most are, in fact, instances of simple action 
used to further the narrative.  For example, in the second half of Persepolis Marji, invited by her 
half-Spanish, half-Austrian boyfriend Enrique, goes to an anarchist’s party in the woods of 
Austria.5  This two-page spread is fundamentally illustrative, the visual and verbal narrative lines 
reflecting each other (Figure 1).  When she says “we arrived in the middle of the forest,” the 
panel indeed shows a car arriving in the middle of a forest; when she says she “saw a group of 
adults chasing one another and shouting,” “[playing] hide-and-seek… then volleyball,” and 
Figure 1 
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“[grilling] sausages while singing Janis Joplin,” each illustrated panel unobtrusively reflects the 
verbal narrative line.  Thus, the reader is guided to follow the simple narrative action, panel by 
panel, allowing the action, itself, to take precedence over any other interpretive or cognitive 
strategies. 
One might ask why the illustrative experience in the modern-day graphic narrative acts 
only as a tool for basic plot development—the ‘simple’ moments of narrative—when it is used in 
real-life for cognitively difficult moments.  One must return to the history of the graphic 
narrative for the answer.  It is true that the illustrative experience was originally implemented 
for the cognitively difficult.  However as the graphic narrative medium developed, the 
modalities used for overcoding information—the visual and verbal narrative lines—evolved 
complexly and independently.  The project remained always the same—to overcode the 
cognitively difficult—but because the medium evolved independently, the goal—to understand 
the cognitively difficult—was compromised.  Remember that for the graphic novelist, “the 
cognitively difficult” is the story.  As the narrative lines as a form grew in complexity over 
generations of cartoonists, the story in that form, too, would grow overwhelmingly complex.  
Additional cognitive experiences evolving out of the illustrative—specifically, the convergent 
and divergent experiences—complicated the original process of overcoding.  The graphic 
novelist’s goal for the reader to understand his story was thus compromised. 
As the graphic narrative developed, the illustrative experience’s goal and project no 
longer coincided.  In order to restore order, the graphic novelist returned to the illustrative 
experience in structural moments in the narrative—moments of basic plot points.  These 
provide a necessary rest in the, at times, frenzied dual-processing of the verbal and visual 
narrative lines.  Without the illustrative experience to provide basic narrative structure, the 
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reader is at risk of becoming disengaged from the text.  The illustrative experience keeps the 
narrative and the reader on track.   
 
B .  V I S U A L  L E X I C O N  
The illustrative experience also structures the graphic narrative by providing it with a 
visual lexicon, but before introducing the visual lexicon as it applies to the illustrative 
experience, it is important to understand how it originated as a visual application of a linguistic 
concept.  It is tempting to analyze the structure of the verbal-visual modes of the graphic 
narrative in terms of language as some theorists do, calling it a “pictorial language,”6 and this 
approach does have its advantages.  However, the verbal mode, as a sequential cognitive 
process, is dependent on syntax—the discrete set of constraints, rules, and processes of 
grammar—making it a sequential process.  It is nonsensical and ungrammatical to have a 
sentence which reads, “Ad one saw I in newspaper a.”  Similarly morphological constraints on 
language make it ungrammatical for a word such as “dress-re” to exist.  Non-verbal modes of 
cognition are usually not so limited.  Instead, the nonverbal mode is usually based on 
synchronous processing.  But because text and image are so intimately connected in the graphic 
narrative, one easily—even naturally—cognizes one in terms of the other,7
The non-verbal mode in the graphic novel creates its own lexicon—a visual lexicon—
from within its own morphology.  A morphology is a system of the smallest meaningful elements 
 particularly in the 
illustrative experience when text and image mirror each other.  Additionally, a narrative 
structure requires narrative conventions.  In a verbal narrative, all the constraints and rules of 
language apply.  In a multimodal narrative, the nonverbal mode needs a similar set of 
constraints and rules to communicate necessary information.  The illustrative experience fills 
this role in a way similar to the linguistic constructions of a lexicon. 
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in a language; the graphic narrative’s morphology is a system of individual images and elements 
of images.  For example, Satrapi introduces us to Marji, a simply drawn girl with a down-turned 
mouth, arched eyebrows, a part down the middle of her hair, etc.  In the opening panel of 
Persepolis—our first text-image interaction—Marji is drawn with a veil and accompanied by the 
text, “This is me when I was 10 years old.  This was in 1980.”8
In another example, little white stars against a black background represent jasmine 
flowers, specifically those jasmine flowers used for perfume which fell from Marji’s 
grandmother’s breasts when she undressed (Figure 2).
  Our first entry in our visual 
lexicon is the veiled Marji.  She provides various types of the same token in the immediately 
following panels to expand our visuo-lexical entry to include unveiled images of Marji. 
9  The image reappears in a different 
context in Marji’s dreams sometime later (Figure 3),10 but the essential morphological capacity 
remains the same.  The image becomes fused with the conceptualization of the grandmother, 
and the grandmother need not even be present (Figure 4).11
Figure 2 - The first entry for the image of the jasmine flower in the visual lexicon. 
  The image retains information and 
is instilled with meaning because of its visuo-lexical entry in the graphic narrative as having 
some quality of [+ GRANDMOTHER] in addition to other qualities like [+ SMELL], as having a 
unique smell.  The reader is able to cognize a white background with black jasmine flowers as 
Marji’s grandmother in her nightgown because of the information stored in the visuo-lexical 
entry.   
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Figure 4 
Figures 3 (L) and 4 (R) – Visual lexeme carries the properties [+ GRANDMOTHER] and [+ SMELL] without either 
being physically imaged in the panel.
  
 
C .   T H E M A T I C  S T R U C T U R E  
Thematic content can also be generated and recognized through the structure and use 
of the visual lexeme.  Just as the jasmine flower visuo-lexeme had attached to it the qualities of 
[+ GRANDMOTHER] and [+ SMELL], certain visuo-lexemes can also contain thematic content like 
[+ IDENTITY] if a visuo-lexeme is associated with understanding character development.  One 
such example is the “collective identity” visuo-lexeme.  Based on Persian classical art, the 
collective identity images are iconographic in nature, usually with symmetrical, identical, and 
repeating figures.  They allow the reader to track the thematic content of identity.  The varying 
forms of the collective identity images, or “collective identity portraits” separate the complete 
version of Persepolis into three parts corresponding with a developing identity: Marji’s 
childhood in Iran, her exile to Europe, and her return to Iran as a transnational. 
The first part of Persepolis, during which Marji is growing up in the turmoil of a revolutionary 
Iran, is marked by a series of collective identity portraits.  Nearly every page has collective 
identity portraits or references to their iconography.  In fact, the first visuo-lexical  
entry the reader receives—the veiled Marji—combines with the visuo-lexical entry of the 
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“collective identity” (Figure 5).  In the next panel Marji continues, “And this is a class photo.  I’m 
sitting on the far left so you don’t see me.”  Beneath the text, Satrapi has drawn four girls 
uniformly wrapped in black veils with their arms crossed.  However, the faces beneath the veils 
are subtly different as if they had stuck their faces in cut-out holes of the State’s ‘virtuous 
Iranian girl.’  The unique aspects of their face emphasize their struggle against being captured in 
the uniformity of their surroundings.  Thus, Satrapi immediately introduces in the “collective 
identity” visuo-lexical entry the thematic content of her struggle against an imposed collective 
identity.  The following panel (Figure 6)—“In 1979 a revolution took place.  It was called ‘the 
Islamic Revolution’” accompanied by a group of Iranians with the same face, the same posture, 
and the same revolutionary gesture—then shifts immediately into the established collective 
identity of her Iranian history. 
The collective identity portraits also tend to show up particularly in scenes of mass 
violence and historical situation, moments when Marji is noticeably connected to her identity as 
an Iranian.  This adds a further thematic and historical layer to the lexical-entry.  Perhaps the 
most striking use of the collective identity portraits occurs when Marji describes her country’s 
history as “2500 years of tyranny and submission,”12 essentially converging the two catalysts of 
Figure 5 
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the collective identity portrait—history and violence, indeed a history of violence.  This panel, 
covering two-thirds of the page (which suggests its importance to the narrative), employs four 
different versions of the collective identity portrait.  The bas-relief imitation images oscillate 
back and forth from left to right as the panel is read from top to bottom, reflecting the recursive 
nature of the Iranian revolutionary history of a country made unstable by its rocking in and out 
of tyranny.  Each of the levels creates a taxonomy of historical actors, using iconographic 
visuals—synchronicity, repetition, and indivisibility—to do so. 
Figure 6 
 
First, the Persians—presumably Marji’s ancestors—are represented with their faces 
hidden, neat rows of bodies bent in a groveling bow before a tyrant built from within their own 
people.  The emperor’s great sword, arched over their heads, marks the beginning of their 
extended history of tyranny, submission, and violence.  Moreover, his sword directs the 
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reader—reading from left to right—to reverse his gaze over the backs of the subjugated 
Persians, thus triggering the first of many more oscillations of power in Iranian history.  The 
throng of Arabs follows on horseback wildly galloping from the West, swords and daggers 
drawn.  Then the Mongols surge past from the East on their white steeds, raining arrows in their 
wake.  Finally, the modern Imperialist forces of America, Great Britain, and Marxism march 
forward, accompanied by hooded executioners.  
The identity Marji has constructed in her narrative is thus molded in relation to the 
visuo-lexical entry of the collective identity portrait.    Because the “collective identity” visual 
lexeme has the thematic content [+ IDENTITY] as established in the opening pages, she and her 
family relate themselves to the conquered, orderly figures with those hidden faces in Figure 6.  
Thematically, the inability to show their faces represents a virtual obliteration of the legitimacy 
of their culture; however, the ordered rows of individual bodies demonstrate a strong union to 
subvert the wild tyranny of their oppressors.  In comparison with Marji’s “othered” collective 
identities in the panel—the Arabs, the Mongols, and the Imperialists—the Persians are the only 
group who maintain some degree of individuality in the representation of singular, separate 
bodies united by synchronized color and form.  The “othered” collective identities, on the other 
hand, are homologous but chaotic and indistinguishable, characterized furthermore by their 
wanton use of swords, arrows, and axes.  In opposition to these “othered” identities, Marji 
creates a collective identity situated in the Iranian historical moment that unites the Persians in 
solidarity against their oppressors.   
The second part of Persepolis, during which Marji lives in Austria as a political refugee, is 
marked by a conspicuous lack of collective identity portraits.  Instead, individual portraits 
without any traditional iconography dominate this section.  Even in instances when it would 
have been appropriate, indeed necessary, to characterize the actors in a collective identity (i.e. 
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scenes of violence or revolution), Satrapi does no such thing.  On the contrary, revolutionary 
fantasies as seen in the chapter “Hide and Seek” are unexpectedly presented unceremoniously 
in the same style as the contemporary narrative (Figure 7).13
            Figure 7 
 
 
Though drawn in three distinguishable groups as marked by the layout of the page, the groups 
are not cloaked in iconography that visually links each individual to its part in the collective 
identity, such as uniformly raised fists14 or synchronized bodies lurching forward.15  Marji is 
undergoing a psychological shift from her experienced collective identity to a newly formed 
individual identity, catalyzed by the European underground of punk-anarchist influence.  The 
shift is further evidenced when she writes: “‘A revolutionary anarchists’ party!’  It reminded me 
of the commitment and the battles of my childhood in Iran.”  Marji’s link to her cultural history 
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without the need to form collective identities suggests that her mode of intra-narrative 
identification has changed from the collective to the individual. 
 
T H E  C O N V E R G E N T  E X P E R I E N C E  
 
The convergent experience is the first of the multimodal experiences that blend the 
visual and verbal narrative lines in a productive manner in their own right.  Whereas the 
illustrative experience did elucidate important secondary analysis of the graphic narrative, its 
cognitive complexity—to overcode and mirror—is nominal.  The convergent experience 
synthesizes disparate visual and verbal narrative lines into a complementary presentation.  
When the two disparate lines converge, the cognitive result is a new and unique experience 
neither present in the verbal nor the visual narrative line.  When two elements come together in 
a productive way in cognition, it creates a conceptual blend.  Mark Turner and Gilles 
Fauconnier’s conceptual blending theory will explain how the convergent experience works in 
the graphic narrative. 
 
A .  C O N C E P T U A L  B L E N D I N G  T H E O R Y  
Conceptual blending—also known as “conceptual integration”16—is a cognitive process 
creating a productive relationship between an otherwise unassociated source and target in 
order to better understand the target, such as a metaphor or simile.  When an element of the 
target conceptual framework, or domain, is cognized in terms of the source domain, and the 
cognitive blend enriches the target.  Turner and Fauconnier assume a modular neural 
architecture: different types of information are handled in distinct “cognitive spaces”17 and 
integrated by intervening processes.18  Simple conceptual blending requires four cognitive 
spaces: one input space for the target domain (A); one space for the source domain (A’); a 
V e r b a l  a n d  V i s u a l  N a r r a t i v e  L i n e s  | 25 
generic space identifying and containing common elements; and a blended space for the 
synthetic understanding of the target element.19
 
 
Three basic processes operate within and between these four neural spaces: 
composition, completion, and elaboration.  First, composition assembles the target and source 
domains in input spaces A and A’, respectively.  Then, completion identifies the parallel 
elements by mapping the target domain onto the source domain and bringing the elements 
together in the generic space.  Lastly, elaboration maps the completed domain from the generic 
space onto the blended space to create novel associative meanings for the target element. 
Metaphor is a simple example of conceptual blending.20  Consider the example: “The 
surgeon is a butcher.”21  All the qualities of a butcher occupy input space A; all qualities of a 
surgeon occupy input space A’.  Simultaneous consideration of these two spaces constitutes 
composition.  Completion proceeds by mapping the two input spaces onto each other as 
follows: 
 
Source A’ 
 
Target A 
Generic 
Space 
 
Blended Space 
Connections between inputs 
and generic and blended spaces 
 
Cross-space mapping to counterpart 
connections in inputs 
 
 
Key 
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Initially, the metaphor may seem to [be] explainable in terms of direct 
projection from the source domain of butchery to the target domain of surgery, 
guided by a series of fixed counterpart mappings: “butcher” onto “surgeon”; 
“animal” (cow) maps onto “human being”; “commodity” onto “patient”; 
“cleaver” onto “scalpel”; and so forth.22
 
 
Grady, Coulson, and Oakley note that this may seem like the entire content of the metaphor, 
but the cognitive blending is not yet complete.  A surgeon is surely incompetent if he is being 
compared to a butcher, but there is no source “incompetency” inherent in “butcher-ness” that 
could be projected onto the target surgeon.  How did it get there? 
This phenomenon is crucial to elaboration.  Productive—or “emergent”23
 
—content is 
revealed by the juxtaposition of elements in the generic space.  In this example, productive 
content emerges from incompatible means-end relationships between the butcher and the 
surgeon.  In input space A, the butcher’s goal is to kill the animal and carve its flesh from its 
bones; in input space A’, the surgeon’s goal is to heal the patient.  When the source’s means-
end relationship is mapped onto the target’s means-end relationship, the resulting product is an 
incompetent surgeon.  Thus, the characteristic of conceptual blending theory is this productive 
content which emerges from the comparison between target and source. 
B .  C O N C E P T U A L  B L E N D I N G  I N  G R A P H I C  N A R R A T I V E  
Conceptual blending in the graphic narrative can work on any of three separate levels: 
the verbal, the visual, and the integration of verbal and visual.  Verbal blends, as in the example 
above, will typically blend semantically—that is, through the linguistic organization of referents 
and semantic categories (i.e. agent, action, environment, instrument, etc.).  Visual blends in the 
graphic narrative (and other subjective, artistic representations), on the other hand, will blend 
stylistic elements which may or may not have underlying semantic content.  For example, the 
recurring use of a particular icon, such as a cross, will carry cultural meaning that cannot be 
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disassociated from it.  There are other artistic techniques that do not carry semantic content; 
rather, they emerge from and are representational of a deeper cultural attitude, like the 
introduction of perspective during the Age of Enlightenment in Europe.  There is no direct 
semantic content available in the use of perspective, but it is representative of the rational 
enlightenment of the era.  For the purposes of this project, however, focus will be on the cross-
modal blend.  
Because the graphic narrative simultaneously presents verbal and non-verbal modes, it 
is possible for there to be a blend across and between modalities.  The elements from the verbal 
and non-verbal modes can be mapped onto each other, creating a cross-modal conceptual 
blend.  The cross-modal blend can be likened to Edwin Hutchins’ material anchor theory of the 
conceptual blend.24  According to his theory, combining material structure with conceptual 
structure is a key reasoning strategy because it grounds the abstract in the concrete.  A 
materially anchored blend is one in which “one input space is an input space in the usual sense, 
a conceptual domain consisting of conceptual elements and relations…. The other input is a 
structured configuration of material elements.”25
Whereas Hutchins’ material anchors are primarily applied to logical inferences, graphic 
narrative’s material anchors are more commonly applied to psychological observations.  This 
comes as no surprise to the medium for which logical inference as a cognitive strategy 
inherently takes a back seat to psychological development.  In the Western tradition, the 
  An example is a clock which maps the 
conceptual input of “time” onto the material structure of a clockface, a timeline with direction.  
In the graphic narrative, the drawn images function as the material anchor in the blend, 
providing stability and structure for cognitively difficult elements of narrative.  However, 
Hutchins’ material anchor differs from the graphic narrative’s in two distinct ways: application 
and form. 
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narrative trajectory traditionally rises to a climax and ends in a dénouement in hopes of 
instigating an emotional response from the reader.  While logic has a place in narrative, it is 
secondary to emotion.  In the graphic narrative, the material anchors are not only applied 
differently but also appear in a different form.  Rather than mental imagery of material 
structures to stabilize the psychological and emotional states in the narrative, the graphic 
narrative makes the mental image concrete in what Sadoski and Paivio call “physical imaging.” 
In Persepolis, for example, Satrapi uses the verbal-visual blend to elicit a non-verbal 
experience of the revolutionary war as it grows out of control.26  Satrapi breaks from the 
narrative of her home life, zooming out to contextualize her own story in the greater story of 
Iranian political history.  At the breaking point of frustration with her mother, after arguing over 
school, Marji asks to go to the basement (Figure 8).  Visually, the panels shift in color from black-
on-white to white-on-black.  The caption reads, “The basement was my hideaway,” shifting the 
Figure 8 
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verbal narrative from a simple script—one action leading to another—to description.  The verbal 
shift to description stops the narrative action and freezes temporality. The abrupt transition 
alerts the reader to a different kind of narrative experience.  As a multimodal experience, it 
changes immediately from the illustrative experience of a tense home life to the convergent 
experience of psychological change induced by the war. 
According to conceptual blending theory, the verbal narrative would be considered the 
conceptual domain of wartime.  The non-verbal structure of Marji’s descent down a staircase 
acts as material anchor.  It anchors the conceptual domain of wartime in the visual imaging of an 
orientational metaphor.27  An orientational metaphor, as Lakhoff and Johnson proffer, internally 
organizes a system of concepts with respect to one another in terms of one or more 
spatialization metaphors.  They are not random associations, but are rooted in physical and 
cultural experience.  For example, the non-verbal experience of “happiness” and 
“consciousness” are often related to the spatialization metaphor of UP, as in “My spirits rose,” 
or “I’m getting up.”28
During composition, elements of wartime fill the domain of input space A while 
elements of the spatialization metaphor fill the domain of input space A’.  During completion, 
the visuo-spatialization metaphor is then mapped onto the verbal conceptual domain of 
wartime.  The completion is perhaps best realized in the middle left panel on the second page of 
  Additionally, “sadness” and “unconsciousness” are often related to the 
spatialization metaphor DOWN, as we see here.  This is directly related to the biology of human 
experience.  Specifically, when a human being dies, he loses his ability to stand upright and his 
body falls down.  Sickness and disease restrict the human body to a horizontal (or anti-upright) 
position.  Lakhoff and Johnson suggest that our understanding of health’s effects on the body’s 
spatial relationship to the earth—healthy as an upright human being, unhealthy as a human 
being lying down—elicits fundamental metaphors of good as UP and bad as DOWN. 
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the two-page spread, in which Marji actively descends the stairs and says aloud, “So we plunged 
deeper into war”29
               Figure 9 
 (Figure 9).  This panel represents the generic space of the conceptual blend, 
bringing together common elements of the wartime script and the spatialization metaphor 
DOWN, re-assigning the spatialization metaphor to describe the war’s intensity.  The most 
complicated step in this blend is elaboration. 
 
In elaboration, the blend reveals that the state of war is rapidly descending into 
negative states of being.  Because the spatialization metaphor is a fundamental one, the reader 
can presuppose the outcome of any conceptual blend which includes the DOWN metaphor.  The 
ultimate physical basis for the DOWN metaphor is understood as death of the human body.  The 
visual nature of this metaphor acts as a continual reminder of what’s to come—actively pushing 
Marji deeper in her descent, closer to the metaphor’s final stage (Figure 10).  “Death,” as an 
element of the conceptual domain, hovers over each panel of the graphic narrative sequence 
until it is visually realized.  In the final full-page panel of the descent sequence, Marji looks down 
into a gruesome scene of wartime death with explosions and dismemberment.  The verbal 
narration accompanies the image both above, “They [the Iranian government] eventually 
admitted that the survival of the regime depended on the war,” and below, “When I think we 
could have avoided it all… It just makes me sick.  A million people would still be alive.”  This final 
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panel represents the final blended space of the conceptual blend, anchored by the spatialization 
metaphor.  Elements from the two input spaces have been mapped onto each other so tightly 
that the target, wartime, assumed the end-goal of the DOWN metaphor, death.  Characteristics 
of the blend have not only been mapped onto each other, but have extended onto Marji, as 
well, who has become “sick” by the display.  The new mapping is a result of elaboration. Marji 
assumes a psychological state of wartime opposition, opposition which was neither inherently 
present in the conceptual domain of wartime nor the spatialization metaphor DOWN. 
Figure 10 
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T H E  D I V E R G E N T  E X P E R I E N C E  
 
Marjane Satrapi claims that “the drawing part of the narration is not illustration.  
Whatever you don’t write, you draw, and vice versa,”30
The processing of divergent experience in real life parallels the evolutionary 
development of diffuse information processing.  Evolutionary survival tactics selected for 
overlapping modes of cognition—which may or may not offer compatible information streams—
to augment the process of information gathering.  In the real world, if one mode fails to provide 
critical data or fails to accurately interpret that data, the other modes act as “back-up.”  
Consider a moment before bed when you suddenly smell something burning outside.  You do 
not see anything wrong from your front window, so you ask your family member, if she or he 
remembered to turn off the grill on the back porch.  She or he says yes and stumbles off to bed.  
Here, the visual and verbal modalities do not suggest danger, but the olfactory does.  You go to 
the back window, see the smoldering grill, and run down to put it out.  The augmentation of 
data collection by the olfactory sense modality protected you from danger.  When competing 
sense modalities present different streams of information, the synthesis of and interference 
between the two streams can save a life, and thus is biologically beneficial to our species. 
 but is that really the case?  There are 
instances in which certain information is not represented in her writing, other instances in which 
it is not represented in her drawing.  These moments in the narrative—when one narrative 
mode is privileged over the other (indeed, to the exclusion of the other)—are classified as 
moments of divergent experience.  With the introduction of the divergent experience, one must 
ask how the reader processes a missing line of narration in a multi-modal text.  How does the 
sudden onset of a mono-modal narrative function cognitively? 
For the graphic narrative, the verbal and non-verbal modes will at times offer divergent 
information streams.  It suggests there are moments in the narrative which necessitate an 
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override of one or the other of the narrative lines.  Again, we are directed towards Ellen 
Spolsky’s reflection, “Together the texts and the pictures ask whether we learn different things 
by hearing a story than by seeing and by touching.  What kind of learning is surest?  Which most 
esteemed?”31
The divergent experience will appear in the graphic narrative in any number of ways, 
but the most common is what I will call the occluded experience.  The occluded experience is a 
daughter to the divergent experience, unique to the narrative mode, in which one line of 
narration is temporarily occluded.  Rather than existing as a naturally-occurring experience, as 
the divergent experience does, the occluded experience is controlled by the author.  Thus, 
authorial choice plays a crucial role in the graphic narrative’s form of divergent experience.  It is 
the author’s deliberate course of action that elicits the divergent experience by refusing to give 
information in certain modalities.  To do this, the author takes advantage of the “narrative 
scaffolding”
  The divergent experience in the graphic narrative takes its cue from this.  Its 
multi-modal presentation may offer competing information, leaving the reader to sort out which 
“is surest.” 
32—the balance of panels with focused narrative content structured by the gaps of 
the gutters.  As Chute suggests, “A comics page offers a rich temporal map configured as much 
by what isn’t drawn as by what is: it is highly conscious of the artificiality of its selective 
borders…”33 Consequently, what I call the occluded experience is self-reflexive, exploiting 
comics conventions.  As a graphic narrative tool, it emphasizes the author’s “awareness of the 
limits of representation:” 34
This is the authority from which the occluded cognitive experience arises in the graphic 
narrative.  It can appear in any variation on occlusion and sequence.  The occluded experience 
will function as any combination of modality occlusion and duration: verbal narrative line vs. 
visual narrative line, and single panel vs. an episode or series of panels.  In Persepolis, Marjane 
 the impossibility of true-to-life narrative transmission. 
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Satrapi occludes the verbal modality by panel and by episode, whereas she will only occlude the 
visual modality by individual panel.  The exclusion of a certain modality begs the questions, 
“What is the effect of choosing one narrative line over another?  Is there a cognitive distinction 
between visual and verbal narrative occlusion that could be made a steadfast rule such that in 
any given situation, the author will choose one narrative line over the other with the same 
cognitive effect?”  Consider the following examples. 
 
A .  O C C L U D I N G  T H E  V E R B A L  M O D A L I T Y  
In an interview, Marjane Satrapi was asked about her decision to give her readers three 
consecutive pages without words.  She responded clearly, “Sometimes talking is just too much. 
Sometimes just showing is enough. I think when people look at this, they understand perfectly 
what is happening, so I don't need to add.”35
Chute alleges, “The most important graphic narratives explore the conflicted boundaries 
of what can be said and what can be shown at the intersection of collective histories and life 
stories,”
  But how is the reader—or at this point, the 
viewer—able to understand perfectly given just one mode of cognition?  What effects does it 
have on the reader to simplify the cognitive experience to the visual narrative alone?  For over 
one hundred pages, the reader-viewer has been bombarded by a multimodal presentation, by a 
variety of cognitive experiences—the illustrative, the convergent, the divergent.  Finally his brain 
has come to terms with the simultaneous narrative lines.  Suddenly, the verbal narrative line is 
taken away, and he is left with images alone.  There is a jarring disconnect.  How now does he 
process the single line without the safety net of the other?  I will return later to the episodic 
example mentioned in the interview above; first, examine the single-panel examples. 
36 and that the occluded experience (what she calls “awareness of the limits of 
representation”) most often arises out of this intersection in moments “specific to the problem 
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of articulating trauma.”37 Her claim proves true for Persepolis: the majority of single-panel 
verbal occlusion occurs immediately following traumatic events.  Twelve out of seventeen 
instances of verbal occlusion occur immediately before, after, or during a traumatic event or 
related traumatic event,38 with three of the five exceptions occurring during Marji’s sojourn to 
Austria,39 when she was geographically removed from the horrors of the Iranian revolution.40  
Of the twelve instances of trauma, ten relate directly to military action: eight are a result of fatal 
military action (or the threat of it) against innocent civilians (Figure 11),41 two a byproduct of 
military engagement.42
The high volume of the verbally occluded experience in relation to military action 
suggests that there is something which cannot or need not be said about this type of 
experienced trauma.  Instead, it redirects your sensory capacities away from the verbal mode 
and towards the non-verbal mode.  The result is a raw sensory experience of an event, 
unmediated by the verbal mode.  Exclusion of the verbal modality—often an aural modality—
comes when there is an excess of environmental noise: demonstrations, missile attacks, etc.  
The reader-viewer no longer occupies his auditory capacity with the text, as he had done 
previously when the verbal mode was present, but lends it entirely to imagining ambient noise.  
Sadoski and Paivio suggest that simplification of auditory information is necessary because, 
 
Attempting to perform two different tasks in one modality causes a disruption 
in one or both of the tasks, but performing two tasks in separate modalities 
does not interfere.  For example, we can listen to music (auditory task) while 
exercising (motor task) without interference; in fact, the two may harmonize.  
But it is difficult to listen to two conversations simultaneously (two auditory 
tasks); we must shuttle back and forth between the two (the “cocktail-party 
effect”).43
 
 
The simplification adds significance, even urgency, to the remaining auditory task.  Without 
verbal mediation, without distraction, the entire cognitive experience surrenders itself to a  
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Figure 11 
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single stream of information from the non-verbal mode.  This draws the reader-viewer more 
deeply into the synchronous, concrete nature of the non-verbal mode and, consequently, into 
the reality of the represented experience. 
Yet, one may ask, “Why is simplification of the auditory mode at all necessary when the 
graphic narrative—with written text and drawn image—is not and, particularly in these 
instances, cannot be heard?”  There is nothing inherently auditory about the graphic narrative; 
however, a narrative’s purpose is to involve the reader in the experience.  It must suggest 
auditory information when the experience calls for it.  To do so, it takes advantage of the only 
directly present non-verbal mode: the visual mode.  Thus, as Tehran is bombed (Figure 11),44
The same can be said for the episodic example of occluded verbal experience, 
mentioned earlier.  In this case, the occluded experience stretches outside the single panel and 
into the series of panels constructing an episode.  The only extended version of the occluded 
experience is a finale of sorts—the last time the occluded verbal experience appears in the 
narrative (Figure 12).  Over the course of three pages and twenty-three panels, Marji describes 
the mass hysteria of a party that was violently raided by the “guardians of the revolution,” 
which terrifyingly builds to a harrowing escape.  For one man, it was no more than life-ending 
attempt at escape: a miscalculated jump from roof to roof, a tumble to his death.
 
jagged flashes of white against the black background suggest violent movement.  Our 
experience—real or perceived—of bombings relates this visual mode to the necessarily 
accompanying auditory mode of shattering explosions and deafening crashes.  Here, our non-
verbal experiences allow the extension of one non-verbal presentation (i.e. the visual) into 
another non-verbal mode (i.e. the auditory).  Even suggesting the use of the auditory capacity is 
thus enough to activate it cognitively and require that it be simplified should two auditory tasks 
compete with each other (i.e. the text and the ambient noise). 
45   
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Figure 12 – The only wordless sequence in Persepolis.  Page 1 (top left), 2 (top right), and 3 (bottom). 
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Again, the simplification of narrative lines increases the urgency of experiencing the non-verbal 
mode, drawing the reader-viewer into the action.  However, the shift from panel to episode also 
affects the reader-viewer’s experience of temporality, which is typically established by the 
verbal narrative line. 
Theorist Henry John Pratt claims that linguistic items are essential elements in relegating 
the narrative’s temporality.  Silence in a panel creates an ambiguous temporality, an image with 
the potential to extend into infinity.46  However, “when words are added,” he writes, “the 
passage of time within the part of the narrative encapsulated by a panel is regulated, guiding 
the reader’s attention and interpretation.”47  Comics theorist Wolk agrees: “…[Y]ou don’t look at 
a given panel’s image for less time than it takes to read all the words in it.”48
tend to hit the brakes when they encounter wordless sequences…. Without 
language acting as a “timer” or contextual cue for understanding the image, 
every visual change causes the reader to stop and assess what exactly is 
happening, and how long it’s supposed to take.
  He suggests that 
this is why readers 
49
 
 
Wordless sequences effectively transfer the power of creating a narrative temporality to the 
reader-viewer, himself.  He is no longer hindered by the sequential nature of the verbal mode, in 
which “the words of a comic… [determine] the pace at which we can read comics and the 
efficiency with which this is possible.”50
 The two-fold temporal shift—from finite to ambiguous temporality, and imposed to 
reader-controlled temporality—elicits an important cognitive change in the Persepolis episode.  
The reader-viewer is uniquely united to the narrative in this moment of trauma.  When the 
temporality shifts into infinity, the episode becomes one that could be experienced at any given 
point in time—one that the reader-viewer cognizes as beyond the finite presentation of the 
Persepolis narrative.  It lends the trauma certain gravity, warning that this type of horror could 
  It forces him to actively participate in the narrative, 
experiencing the unfolding action as he personally must experience it. 
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happen at any point in time and to anyone at all, given similarly tyrannous circumstances.  At 
the same time that the episode suspends itself in a meta-narrative, it grounds the reader-viewer 
in an active experience of the episode.  The simultaneous suspended narrative and grounded 
narrative allows the reader-viewer to process the episode potentially as part of his or her own 
narrative. 
 
B .  O C C L U D I N G  T H E  V I S U A L  M O D A L I T Y  
Marjane Satrapi rarely employs the occluded experience for the visual modality, though 
other graphic narrative author-artists may be more inclined to do so.51
Complete occlusion of the visual modality occurs only once in the entirety of Persepolis 
(Figure 13).  A missile from an Iraqi attack on Tehran destroys a childhood friend’s home.
  Accordingly, the 
occluded visual experience is carefully applied in single panels, only when necessary.  Moreover, 
it has a distinct motivating factor compared to the occluded verbal experience.  In this case, the 
reader is left fumbling without images entirely.  Unlike the convergent experience in which the 
visual narrative line is present but does not reflect the verbal line, the occluded experience 
removes the visual line entirely. 
52 53  
The text reads, “When we walked past the Baba-Levy’s house, which was completely destroyed, 
I could feel that she [Marji’s mother] was discreetly pulling me away.  Something told me that 
the Baby-Levy’s had been at home.  Something caught my attention.”  The visual mode allows 
the reader-viewer to see what Marji sees: to catch our attention with a turquoise bracelet 
amidst the rubble, a bracelet belonging to her friend Neda.  The following series of four panels 
progress into complete visual occlusion.  Panel 1 of the series focuses Marji’s gaze on the 
bracelet while the verbal line describes the bracelet’s significance.  Panel 2 retreats to Marji’s 
watery gaze alone, hand covering her mouth for the unspeakable: “The bracelet was still 
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attached to… I don’t know what.”  At this point, the narrative still rests in the illustrative 
experience.  Indeed, the covered mouth visually illustrates Marji’s inability to speak—to verbally 
materialize what is non-verbally realized.  Panel 3 prepares the reader-viewer for the transition 
into the occluded visual experience: what she could not utter in Panel 2 is what she can no 
longer bear to see, so she covers her eyes and says nothing.  Panel 4 is complete darkness, 
complete occluded visual experience.  A bar of text at the bottom of the panel is all that 
remains: “No scream in the world could have relieved my suffering and my anger.”  Absence of 
image and by extension absence of ambient noise, fittingly relieve the multimodal narrative of 
virtually all non-verbal experience.  The narrative is simplified to the verbal mode, with all 
auditory capacity limited to the text of the page—hardly a scream. 
Just as in the occluded verbal experience, the occluded visual experience occurs most 
often in representations of trauma; however, rather than motivated by a heightened sensory 
experience of trauma, it seeks to mediate the traumatic experience.  This type of trauma cannot 
be experienced, cannot be seen, because of its incredible impact on the developing Marji.  With 
extreme hesitation—progressing only panel by panel—the image of Neda’s fractured, dead 
body is occluded not only from Marji’s memory, but from Satrapi’s representation of the 
memory.  It is not just an act of reverent omission, protecting the memory of her friend, but it is 
a distinct cognitive strategy.  The text must act as the mediator for the narrative and separate 
the sensory experience from the narrative action.  Once separated from the concrete, the 
moment can be processed abstractly.  First, this allows Marji to dehumanize the experience and 
distance herself from it.  Second, it jars the reader from the comfortable presentation of text-
image.  It asks him to first process the text, and then image for himself. 
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Figure 13 
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C O N C L U S I O N  
 
Persepolis is a prime example of one of Hillary Chute’s proposed “most important 
graphic narratives”: “[those which] explore the conflicted boundaries of what can be said and 
what can be shown at the intersection of collective histories and life stories.”54
The multimodal presentation can be cognitively difficult.  With the graphic narrative 
only beginning to grace critical discourse, many are frustrated by the multimodal presentation 
(not to mention its mass appeal), unable to “decode” the “double-coded narrative.”
  The reader-
viewer’s experience of the text will vary significantly based on the author’s manipulation of 
those conflicted boundaries.  The illustrative experience primarily gives the narrative structure, 
allowing the convergent and divergent experiences to manipulate the tensions inherent in text-
image juxtaposition. 
55  As Art 
Spiegelman said, “If comics have any problem now, it’s that people don’t even have the patience 
to decode comics at this point…. I don’t know if we’re the vanguard of another culture or if 
we’re the last blacksmiths.”56  However, this chapter sought to explicate a basic understanding 
of the variety of cognitive experiences available to the graphic narrative so that those “last 
blacksmiths” of coded narrative can share their talents with a greater audience. 
 H o w  I m a g i n g  A f f e c t s  A u t h e n t i c i t y  | 44 
 
C H A P T E R  3  
 
“ T r u t h  t r a d e s  i n  1 , 0 0 0  w o r d s ”  
 
H o w  I m a g i n g  A f f e c t s  t h e  
A u t h e n t i c i t y  o f  N o n f i c t i o n  
 
 
 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
An autobiography is a self-portrait.  Each of those italicized words suggests a 
double entity, expressed as a series of reciprocal transactions.  The self thinks 
and acts; it knows that it exists alone and with others.  A portrait is space and 
time, illusion and reality, painter and model—each element places a demand, 
yields a concession.  A self-portrait is even more uniquely transactional.  No 
longer distinctly separate, the artist-model must alternately pose and paint…. 
Autobiography is a literary version of this curious artifact.1
 
 
Without a breath of hesitation, William Howarth unites literature and art, explaining 
one in terms of the other.  For him, as for many of us, the bond between different artistic 
mediums is undeniable: music, sculpture, dance, literature, and art all privilege the subjective 
expression over the severity of strict objective documentation.  To unite autobiography to self-
portraiture, no less—invoking the artist’s brushstroke in the writer’s script—Howarth 
unintentionally marries text and image together in his theory of autobiography.  Marjane 
Satrapi’s Persepolis manifests that marriage in the very project of an autobio-graphic novel. 
The previous chapter categorized the interactions between (and formal implications of) 
the visual and verbal modes in the graphic narrative as a medium; however, a multimodal 
presentation has specific and far-reaching implications for the nonfiction genre within the 
medium of graphic narrative.  As a genre, nonfiction graphic narratives range in form and 
content from technical writing (i.e. instruction manuals) to journalism (i.e. photograph essays) 
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to autobiography.  Of most importance for this project is that subgenre which infuses 
autobiography with a visual modality—a graphic element—transforming the autobiographic 
novel into the autobio-graphic novel.  The subjectivity already inherent in autobiography as a 
self-constructed narrative gets compounded with the subjectivity in hand-drawn renderings of 
nonfiction images.  This chapter will reveal the tensions within a multimodal work of nonfiction 
with layered subjectivity.  It will further demonstrate why images are used at all in a work of 
autobiography and how they benefit the project, despite the tensions it creates.   
 
A U T O B I O G R A P H Y  A N D  A U T H E N T I C I T Y  
 
Like its mono-modal cousin of conventional literature, the autobio-graphic novel 
adheres to certain constraints of the autobiography genre.  One of autobiography’s earliest 
premises is a “promise to tell the truth,”2 but what sort of truth does it tell?  One theorist argues 
that autobiography “is an attempt to reconcile one’s life with one’s self and that therefore the 
core of autobiography is not historical accuracy but metaphorical truth.”3
As opposed to all forms of fiction, biography and autobiography are referential 
texts: exactly like scientific or historical discourse, they claim to provide 
information about a “reality” exterior to the text, and so to submit to a test of 
verification.  Their aim is not simple verisimilitude, but resemblance to the 
truth.  Not “the effect of the real,” but the image of the real.  All referential 
texts thus entail what I will call a “referential pact,” implicit or explicit, in which 
are included a definition of the field of the real that is involved and a statement 
of the modes and the degree of resemblance to which the text lays claim.
  Autobiography is an 
opportunity to shape and reshape the author’s truth to reconcile meaning in her life and attach 
causality to a series of events.  It stands in opposition to objective nonfiction—reports, agendas, 
and news articles, for example—because of its subjective, reconstructed nature.  Yet there 
remains a balance between the historical accuracy and metaphorical truth.  Philippe Lejeune 
identifies this as the “referential pact” of autobiography: 
4
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 The referential pact induces a contingent cognitive understanding of nonfiction; rather 
than “suspension of disbelief” in fiction, or simply “belief” in testimonials or documentation, 
autobiography induces conditional belief.  The reader will believe in the truth of the narrative if 
its representational qualities do not overshadow an attempt at historical accuracy.  It thus 
creates a problem of authenticity.  As soon as the subjective enters into nonfiction, the reader 
instinctively weighs the authenticity of the source.  Authenticity, here, has a twofold meaning: 
colloquial and diegetic.  Colloquially, authenticity is the character of being “authentic or entitled 
to acceptance.”5
One might think, “If the subjective can enter into the verbal modality alone (in 
conventional autobiography) and problematize the authenticity of nonfiction, then surely 
additional subjectivity from a second modality would further complicate the problem of 
authenticity.”  This is not always the case.  Added modalities do not automatically and 
exponentially problematize authenticity.  Indeed, Sadoski and Paivio suggest that dually coded 
information is “more memorable”
  Diegetically, authenticity is a narrative quality describing the ability to 
convince the reader that the narration does, indeed, have some degree of truth.  It is a narrative 
which passes the test of the reader’s truth-value judgments.  This necessarily implies that the 
reader does pass judgment on the authenticity of a subjective work presented as truth under its 
“nonfiction” name.   
6 and assists in “making sense of text where that phrase is 
taken literally.  We invest a text with meaning by making it a quasi-sensory event…”7
 
  However, 
the following analysis of images in nonfiction will describe the ways in which the additional 
visual mode can simultaneously increase and decrease the authenticity of the autobiography.  
First, consider an author’s justifications for the decision to include the visual mode in a 
nonfiction narrative. 
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W H Y  U S E  I M A G E S  I N  N O N F I C T I O N ?   
 
Graphic novels are defined by their simultaneous presentation of separate narrative 
lines—the visual and the verbal.  Each line of narration affects a separate sense modality which 
bombards the cognitive process of reading a singular text with a flurry of multimodal sensory 
information.  Charles Hatfield writes, “…[C]omics [or graphic novels] can be a complex means of 
communication and are always characterized by a plurality of messages.  They are 
heterogeneous in form, involving the co-presence and interaction of various codes.”8  He argues 
that some readers would consider the graphic narrative framework to be “fragmented and 
unstable”9
…[S]ilent reading (visual task) may be disrupted by experiencing related visual 
images (visual task) at the same time.  A qualification here is the degree of 
activity—barely perceptible imagery will probably not cause a ripple in the 
reading process, but intense visualization may interfere until rereading is 
necessary.
 because of the dual presentation of the stereotypically divergent entities of text and 
image.  Cognitive theorists confirm the difficulties of processing multimodal information: 
10
 
 
While there are certainly tensions in juxtaposing the verbal and non-verbal lines of 
narration, there is the possibility for productive and creative associations, as well.  “In some 
cases our imagistic associations blend across modalities into a holistic, multimodal experience 
that reflects physical reality.”11  It seems reasonable to assume that greater sensory information 
generates a more complete representation of experienced reality.  If you can see a steaming 
mug, smell fresh-ground coffee beans, taste the whisper of hazelnut against the dark bitter 
grounds, and feel the warmth spread from fingertips to tongue to the rest of your body, chances 
are you are fully experiencing a fresh-brewed cup of coffee.  The multiplicity of sensory 
experiences provided in communication here, resulted in a more holistic communicated 
message.  The blend across sense modalities in this sense did not produce tensions. 
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However, when mental imaging materializes in physical images, will produce tensions—
what one person produces in mental imaging will not always synchronize with someone else.  
This is due to the unique collection of sensory experiences on which mental imaging is based.  
The infinite variety of sensory perception and nonverbal processing differs from individual to 
individual and will produce a unique mental image.  Graphic novels present this as the author’s 
style or perspective.  Douglas Wolk provides an example: 
When you look at, say, a Will Eisner drawing of a tenement in the Bronx, you 
know that what you’re seeing represents a tenement in the Bronx, and you 
believe on some level that it’s real, because it’s in front of your eyes.  But you 
also understand that you’re not seeing an actual building or a building you could 
have seen unaided by the drawing.  What you’re looking at is a manifestation of 
Eisner’s style, a personal interpretation of what that sort of building looks like.12
 
 
Here, the reader is removed as active participant from the graphic narrative on one level 
by virtue of subjectivity.  When graphic novels provide images for the reader—depriving him of 
a creative imaging process of his own—the reader is forced to process the given visual stimuli as 
his own.  If the provided image conflicts with his own mental imaging, then the standard 
cognitive reading process—that ‘suspension of disbelief’—is jolted.  Indeed, tensions can arise 
stylistically—if the given images do not correspond with perceived reality, like caricatures, for 
example—and diegetically—in the divergent cognitive experience of the graphic narrative, for 
example.  The reader, unfamiliar with these new variations on the reading process and jarred by 
its complexities, must recognize the multimodal sensory input to make sense of it.  
Theoretically, the author is dangerously close to alienating the reader by removing—or 
reshaping—his usual role in processing the narrative. 
Why is it then that so many theorists have argued that the graphic narrative is an “art of 
tensions,”13 often characterized by the complications of its multimodal sensory experience, the 
juxtaposition of disparate visual and verbal narrative lines?  It would seem that the more 
sensory information received, the more completely a message is communicated.  There should 
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not be this discrepancy, yet it remains common knowledge in the realm of comics criticism.  In 
graphic narrative, the question shifts from “How does multimodal sensory information 
communicate a more realistic message?” to “What happens if the multimodal sensory 
information does not correspond with our perceived reality?” 
Going beyond Sadoski and Paivio’s assertion that we use images to make sense of text, 
some theorists have argued that human beings “hunger” for images and have coined the term 
“iconotropism” to describe this state.  Ellen Spolsky explains, “Iconotropism… [hypothesizes] 
that human beings feed on pictures, metabolize them—turn them into nourishment—because 
we need the knowledge they provide.  We turn toward pictures when they are available, we 
imagine them if they’re not, and we produce them if we can.”14  In fact, it is creative imaging 
and sign manipulation that differentiates us from other cognitively developed species.15
However, when text and image join together in the act of representation, they create 
“gaps” in cognition.  The modularity theory of cognition, as explained in Chapter 1, contends 
that parallel processes of cognition occur simultaneously, but the multiplicity of knowledge cues 
creates these “gaps.”
 
16  In the autobio-graphic novel, for example, the reader is presented with 
the verbal and visual narrative lines and must “bridge the gap” between the verbal and 
nonverbal modalities, between word and image.  When the bridge crosses between word and 
image, it can be liberating for the reader-viewer but dangerous for the genre of nonfiction.  “The 
gaps between word and image, signifier and signified, mind and body, will and reason…” writes 
Spolsky, “are precisely the sites of our freedom to hypothesize and test hypotheses, to 
reorganize and reinvent ourselves as needed.”17  The cognitive possibilities of multimodal 
experiences and dual processing are indeed cognitively stimulating, but “reorganization” and 
“reinvention” are terms virtually antithetical to the authenticity of nonfiction.  Regardless, 
Persepolis and other autobio-graphic novels persevere, so how is the gap problem mediated? 
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In the context of dual coding theory, this “bridging the gap” between verbal and 
nonverbal is defined as referential processing.  The problem for the nonfiction author is how to 
adequately control the reader’s referential processing; or, more appropriately, the author must 
develop a way to stimulate the reader’s referential processing to induce the ‘correct’ cognitive 
bridge—one that leads to the author’s intended narrative destination.  This is where imaging 
becomes important. 
Sadoski and Paivio offer a key to stimulating referential processing: concreteness.  They 
write, “Mental imagery is more likely to be evoked by concrete language than abstract language, 
and still more by pictures than by concrete language.”18
Nonverbal mental imagery apparently [has] limitations.  Visual images seem like 
“grainy” photos with much out of focus; detail is lost with imagined distance; 
and they fade rapidly, needing to be “rejuvenated,” or reactivated, frequently.  
For example, imagine a pirate with a wooden leg.  Was the pirate wearing a hat?  
Logically the pirate either wore a hat or did not.  However, because our focus 
was on the wooden leg, we may not have clearly envisioned the head and must 
mentally scan upward, take a wider angle, or refabricate the image to clearly 
‘see.’  Mental representations in other modalities are similarly imperfect, and 
our refabrications and rejuvenations can introduce elaboration, distortion, and 
interpolation.
  Representations which include physical 
representations (i.e. pictures), then, will better stimulate specific referential processing.  If an 
author surrenders imaging to the reader by omitting the concrete representations available in 
pictures, then the reader’s referential processing is less predictable, less controlled, and—worst 
of all for communicating nonfiction, truth—more variable. Consider the example of the 
limitations of imaging a pirate, where nonverbal mental imagery is self-generated: 
19
  
 
If an image of a pirate—without any additional emotional or cultural implications—is 
this vulnerable to mutability, then the gaps in cognizing adolescence, love, war, violence, 
ignorance—the list goes on!—allow for the possibility of a dangerous turn away from 
autobiography’s basic premise: to tell the truth.  The danger of losing details to gaps in cognition 
may be too great for authors writing autobiographies that delve into historically sensitive 
 H o w  I m a g i n g  A f f e c t s  A u t h e n t i c i t y  | 51 
subject matter, as is the case with Marjane Satrapi and Persepolis.  Providing images is a way to 
remember and communicate the visceral truth of momentous human experiences.  These are 
images which need to be seen, not imagined and left prey to the attacks of Elaboration, 
Distortion, and Interpolation—a trio of Truth’s enemies.  Instead, the autobio-graphic narrative 
adds the visual modality to protect against these misrepresentations.  The visual modality 
insures nonfiction’s verisimilitude with its mnemonic and epistemic cognitive functions, which 
are intimately tied together. 
 
A. M N E M O N I C  F U N C T I O N  
Images “stock” and aid memory: “Vision is constructed and enabled by memory, and 
memory is stocked by vision,”20
Recently, scientists have provided experimental evidence in support of image-memory 
enhancement.  For example, Craik and Tulving
 Ellen Spolsky writes.  For centuries, nonverbal cognitive 
processes were used as mnemonic devices—from Simonides of Ceon’s loci method (circa 500 
BC) to dual coding theory’s conceptual peg hypothesis.  The loci method is the oldest known 
mnemonic device.  Employed by rhetoricians, it associated specific talking points of a speech 
first with a geographic location, then with a representational image.  The rhetorician would 
recall a familiar path—walking around his home for example, each room containing an imagined 
object to cue memory.  As he mentally travels from one room to the next, he sees the image 
cue—perhaps a broken sword to signify the end of a war—and is reminded of the next point in 
his speech. 
21 designed an experiment to test the 
correspondence between levels of linguistic processing and rates of memory retention.  At any 
given point, a literate reader must “progress through graphemic (visual), phonemic (sound), and 
semantic (meaning) codes.  The levels-of-processing approach predicts that remembering 
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depends on the level to which it has been processed with deeper (meaningful) processing 
leading to better retention.”22
1) “Is it an animal?” which targets semantic processing; 
  Participants were asked to process a list of 60 common words by 
answering questions relating to the word’s meaning, sound, or appearance.  For example, if the 
processed word was “BEAR,” participants might be asked any of the following three questions to 
ascertain levels-of-processing: 
2) “Does it rhyme with ‘care?’” which targets phonemic processing; and 
3) “Is it in upper-case letters?” which targets graphemic processing. 
The results of Craik and Tulving’s experiment affirmed the prediction of the levels-of-
processing approach: there was a significantly higher retention rate of words associated with 
semantic codes (0.90) than words associated with phonemic codes (0.65) and graphemic codes 
(0.42).  Now, contextualize this information in the signifier-signified model of cognitive 
representation—where the signifiers are the linguistic graphemes, phonemes, and morphemes 
and the signified are the semantic concepts, or the knowledge gained from real-world 
experience.  A reader is statistically more likely to retain information about the signified rather 
than the signifier.  In other words, a reader will retain information processed on a deeper, more 
meaningful level that corresponds not to the linguistic representation but to the meaning 
garnered from sensory experience.  A reader will retain the image of the bear, itself, more often 
than he will retain the image of the word “bear” (or the sound of the word “bear”). 
Other studies have shown that images—as a component of nonverbal cognitive 
processing—are better retained than words in most types of retention tests.  This includes even 
those tests that seem facially logocentric, or those that appear to have a verbal bias: 
For example, if a long series of pictures and concrete words [i.e. a picture of a 
bicycle vs. the concrete noun “telephone”]… are presented, and people are 
asked to recall them by writing either the words presented or the names of the 
pictured objects, pictures are better remembered than words.  This occurs 
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despite the fact that the verbal mode of response would seem to favor verbal 
over pictorial encoding.23
 
 
The referential processing of the images and their recall in the verbal mode did not dampen the 
effect the nonverbal mode had on memory retention.  All of this evidence makes a case for 
employing the nonverbal modality in memory tasks.  Because the nonverbal modality—and 
images specifically—are better remembered than abstractions and linguistic referents, it is 
reasonable for autobiography—essentially a memory task—to employ pictorial encoding. 
If images and deep semantic content are retained better than linguistic referents, then 
the remembered event can be communicated with less cognitive mediation.  Cognitive 
mediation, here, is any process which departs further from the experienced reality or event to 
be remembered.  Cognitive mediation is unavoidable in memory tasks where the lived 
experience is removed physically and temporally; however, the degree to which a memory is 
cognitively mediated is important.  Consider it in terms of a derivation in calculus: a function 
may have two derivatives—a direct derivation of the function, and a derivation of the 
derivation.  In our case, the function is the memory; the first derivative of the memory is the 
nonverbal mode of experience; and the second derivative of memory (the derivative of the 
nonverbal mode) is the verbal mode.  Information encoded in the verbal mode is more difficult 
to retain than information retained in the nonverbal mode (i.e. imagery). 
The degree of cognitive mediation directly corresponds to the degree of memory 
retention: more difficult information to retain is more cognitively mediated.  Ergo, less difficult 
information to retain is less cognitively mediated.  The data provided illustrates that memory 
communicated in the nonverbal modality is less difficult to retain; thus, it is less cognitively 
mediated than memory communicated in the nonverbal modality.  The better remembered the 
event, the more authentic.  In the case of autobiography, using the nonverbal modality makes 
the communicated story more authentic. 
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 Dual coding theory and the conceptual peg hypothesis posit that images not only aid 
memory, but construct it.  The conceptual peg hypothesis states that episodic memory is 
organized and processed in “chunks,” and each chunk contains a representative element to 
which some part of the episode is “pegged” or “hooked.”  More specifically, “pieces of a text 
such as individual story events, points in an exposition or argument, or even individual 
sentences are temporarily held in memory as represented by key language and/or key images”24
Formally, the autobio-graphic narrative parallels the structure and organization of 
episodic memory.  Just as the conceptual peg hypothesis posits that episodic memory is 
chunked and pegged to an image, the panels of the graphic narrative chunk the narrative into 
elemental parts, and tie each panel to a particular image.  The structure of panels segments 
episodes into concrete, singular moments that are linked together only by the process of 
reading.  Until now, comics theorists have considered this a convention unique to the medium.  
Cognitive theory reveals that it is not unique, but in fact a universal cognitive convention.  It is 
the manifestation of our episodic memory processing.  So for a project whose aim is to 
remember, this is particularly relevant. An autobio-graphic narrative is an autobiography told in 
a way that mimics the actual cognitive process of remembering.  It protects even further against 
cognitive mediation of memory, documenting as accurately as possible—even down to formal 
presentation—the act of remembering. 
 
(emphasis mine).  This proves to be an important cognitive detail when analyzing the structure 
and formal constraints of the autobio-graphic narrative. 
Accordingly, this authorial choice seems to bring along with it the complications of 
episodic memory retrieval.  In dual coding theory, “a memory episode is a composite of 
modality-specific verbal and nonverbal representations derived from external experienced 
events and the internal verbal and nonverbal representations that are evoked by those 
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events.”25  However, in the process of encoding memories and reconciling verbal and nonverbal 
representations, the external and the internal stimuli, memory’s accuracy necessarily 
diminishes.  It is a matter of simplification for faster, more efficient processing.  Thus, episodic 
memories, however detailed, are almost always incomplete and altered: “They are incomplete 
because of limitations on encoding; some detail is always lost.  They are altered because internal 
representations are associatively added to the episode.”26
Yet, any project which involves episodic memory recall—therefore, any 
autobiography—will necessarily be incomplete and altered.  The graphic narrative, however, 
brings these problems to the forefront and makes them plainly visible to the reader.  The reader 
is reminded of the incomplete each moment he must jump the gutter from panel to panel; he is 
reminded of the altered each moment he sees the hand-rendered images.  Satrapi has enforced 
a transparency policy of sorts on her memory.  Let it be known that this is memory, that this is 
autobiography, and while it is incomplete and altered, it is the closest to truth that human 
memory can reach.  When asked about the inability to remember and record specific details of 
episodes, Satrapi hotly retorted,  
 
…for example, if I say… the Rex Cinema was burned in Tehran—of course I will 
check out the date, and of course I will say exactly what happened, but how do 
you want me exactly to remember all the dialogues?  Basically, yes, it was an 
ambience like that, and the things that I’m talking about, of course they are not 
bullshit—but at the same time, it should be read as a story.27
 
 
B. E P I S T E M I C  F U N C T I O N  
The cognitive process of remembering is uniquely tied to the cognitive process of 
knowing.  One has knowledge of something when one can recall and retrieve that piece of 
information.  Cognitive psychologists Roger Schank and Robert Abelson go so far as to suggest 
that “virtually all human knowledge is based on stories constructed around past experiences.”28  
Mark Turner similarly suggests that all comprehension and cognitive organization are basic 
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literary functions, explaining how story and projection (combined in parable) are the 
foundational structures of human thought.  One uses memory to construct stories about past 
experiences in order to be able to recall them as knowledge at a later time. 
When knowledge is associated with memory,29 it is usually attributable to first-hand or 
personal experience.  The key difference between remembering and knowing is one of truth-
value judgments.  How information is remembered will affect its truth-value.  For example, we 
know how to tie our shoes because it is an action ingrained in our procedural memory.  We 
assign a great truth-value to the action of tying our shoes because of the success one has in 
recalling and employing the procedural memory.  Lo and behold, if the procedural memory is 
recalled and employed, one’s shoes will be tied.  Also, we know that elephants are animals, or 
keys can lock doors because these are facts ingrained in our semantic memory.  We assign a 
great truth-value to the semantic content of ELEPHANT as ANIMAL and KEY as LOCKING AGENT 
because of the relative success of applying the semantic content truthfully in any given situation 
with an elephant or a key.  This knowledge was gained first-hand either through physical action, 
as in procedural memory, or deep cognitive processing, as in semantic memory.  Other 
knowledge is gained from cognitive processing of scripts, which combines procedural and 
semantic memory, in one type of episodic memory.  A script is a “set of expectations about what 
will happen next in a well-understood situation.”30  For example, anyone familiar with eating at 
a restaurant understands that, at some point, a waiter or waitress will approach his table and 
ask for an order.  We accept these facts at face value because they have been personally stored 
in our memory.  This type of knowledge is understood as primary knowledge and processed as 
such, virtually without hesitation.31  It is associated with truth and fact because it has been 
directly, immediately, and personally perceived and stored in memory.  Again, this type of 
knowledge is assigned great truth-value. 
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However, other types of episodic memory are often considered second-hand 
memories—or someone else’s memories—and are cognized differently.  This type of episodic 
memory is a type of hearsay, knowledge attained indirectly from another’s personal experience.  
For example, we may say we know that a friend likes profiteroles because he raved about them 
at a New Year’s Eve party.  However, we cannot personally experience the friend’s taste-buds 
being pleasurably stimulated.  That is stored in and retrieved from his personal episodic 
memory.  What he tells you is in your episodic memory because you process his act of 
communication as a particular event over time, but it is one degree removed from the directly 
experienced truth.  This kind of knowledge is secondary knowledge: “I know because he knows.”  
Episodic memory recall of this kind can be described as the “he-said-she-said” problem, the kind 
one finds in autobiography.  It will deleteriously affect the truth-value of attained knowledge. 
To combat a diminished truth-value in autobiography, Marjane Satrapi uses images to 
add an element of primary knowledge to the story.  Primary knowledge, as suggested earlier, 
can be based on direct sensory perception of an experienced event.  It is impossible for Satrapi’s 
audience to have had the opportunity to experience each and every one of Satrapi’s memories 
directly, and precisely as she experienced them.  By offering images of the events, Satrapi can 
edge closer to offering the reader a primary experience of knowledge.  This is because images 
are given greater truth-value than words, in part due to their close relationship with memory.  
Memory has been tied directly to knowledge.  By extension then, images (and other sensory-
induced stimuli of events) are also tied to knowledge and truth-value judgments.  In fact, some 
theorists have argued that images are not only related to experienced reality, but that “an 
image is not absolutely cognitively distinct from reality, and functions, at least in part, ‘as if it 
were the real thing.’”32
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T Y P E S  O F  I M A G E S  I N  N O N F I C T I O N  
 
 Generally speaking, images in nonfiction may be used in a variety of contexts to give 
credibility to a source, authenticity to a narrative, or emotional ambiance to an experience.  
Historically and culturally, however, there is a distinct divide between two types of images: 
objective documentation and subjective representation, either or both of which may be used in 
autobio-graphic narratives. 
 
A. O B J E C T I V E  D O C U M E N T A T I O N  
Objective documentation is a type of nonfiction imaging which captures an event 
realistically, naturally, and with as little subjective influence as possible.  The most common type 
of objective documentation today is photography.33  When we are presented with documented 
evidence, we accept the evidence as fact and integrate it into our semantic or episodic memory.  
However, just as in first-hand accounts of memory, nonverbal evidence takes precedence over 
verbal evidence.  Images are given greater truth value than words, as illustrated in our legal 
system which dictates that hearsay—linguistic evidence, or what someone said or heard—is 
inadmissible.  “The authoritative documentary instrument of modern culture,” Carol Zemel 
argues, “…is the camera.”34  Photographs are generally accepted directly as evidence and 
synthesized into the viewer’s knowledge as fact.35  The viewer assimilates the picture into his 
memory and then knows what he has seen to be true.  Though it is technically secondary 
knowledge, the viewer assigns it equal truth value with primary knowledge.  Reason for 
attributing lesser truth-value to an image is directly related to the problems of episodic memory: 
alteration and incompletion.  Though a single photograph cannot escape the problem of 
incompletely documenting a memory, a series of photographs can mitigate it.  More 
importantly, documentary photographs36 are trusted to be unaltered.  Wolk suggests that it 
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goes beyond the viewer’s trust, but is implicit in the medium itself.  He writes, “Film and 
photography intrinsically claim to be accurate documents, even when they’re not: they always 
have the pretense that they are showing you something you would have seen exactly the same 
way if you’d been present at the right time and place.”37
 
 
B. S U B J E C T I V E  R E P R E S E N T A T I O N  
Subjective representation is a type of imaging which is constructed, manipulated, 
and/or aesthetized to go beyond strict documentation into expression—drawings, paintings, 
sketches, and even artistic photography to some extent.  The historical accuracy is constrained 
first by the artist’s explicit subjectivity, second by the viewer’s complicit subjectivity in the act of 
viewing and interpreting.  Whereas objective documentation suspends the viewer’s 
interpretative skills, subjective representation embraces them.  However, as discussed earlier, 
as soon as subjectivity enters the scene, so to speak, the episode’s truth-value assignment 
diminishes.  The historical accuracy of the episode is compromised by external stimuli, which 
could be emotional, physical, psychological, etc.  Subjective representation filters an image 
through any number of these external lenses, opening the door for misrepresentation.  The final 
product is “a particular, personal version of its artist’s vision—not what the artist’s eye sees, but 
the way the artist’s mind interprets sight.”38   The insertion of one step in the imaging process—
interpretation—clouds the inherent value of subjective representation as an authentic means of 
documenting history.  In Zemel’s articulate analysis of primary source drawings from the 
Holocaust, she acknowledges the diminished authenticity art has as a form of historical 
documentation.  She writes, “Instead, the sacral or relic dimension of the drawings has turned 
attention to their maker, with subjective expression replacing testimony.  The move, then, is to 
 H o w  I m a g i n g  A f f e c t s  A u t h e n t i c i t y  | 60 
consider the drawing as works of art, valued for their individual expression and evaluated for 
their artistic mastery.”39
 
 
C. O B J E C T I V E  A N D  S U B J E C T I V E  C O N F L A T E :  R E N D E R E D  F A C T  
To combat a diminished authenticity, the auto-biographic novel offers its version of 
visual documentation.  Satrapi uses drawn images to give her communicated human experience 
authenticity, fueling the cycle of image-enhanced memory and memory-enhanced images.  At 
the same time that her images give the narrative a visceral authenticity, the subjectivity of 
artistic renderings makes it cognitively inferior to photographic documentation.  Zemel has 
argued that this belief devalues expressionistic renderings as “a standard of truthful reportage” 
and acknowledges only realism and documentation.  The stylistic presence of the author-artist’s 
hand in autobio-graphic novels makes it difficult for a reader to overcome the subjective hurdle 
in cognizing the truth values of the narrative.  On many levels, the reader does accept what he 
sees as a version of truth, but as Wolk mentioned earlier, it is also recognized as a manifestation 
of the author’s style. 
In Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis, the dual presentation of a visual and verbal narrative 
takes advantage of the cognitive processes of memory, knowledge, and truth-value judgments.  
While the subjective nature of drawn images dilutes the truth value of her work, she uses 
specific cartooning techniques to manipulate the reader’s levels of processing so that the reader 
is more likely to accept her drawings as a suitable pictorial alternative to documentation.  
Consider, for example, her use of photographic evidence in Persepolis (Figure 14).40  During the 
Iranian Revolution, Marji’s father risked his life to document the revolutionary activity and the 
Shah’s violent response.  Below Marji’s verbal narrative, “He [her father] took photos every day.  
It was strictly forbidden…” is an unbounded—or, unconfined panel without limiting borders—
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picture of her father hunched over a camera, pointing to an open-edged collage of photographs.  
These are not the actual photographs, however, but a subjective representation of them.  When 
considering objective versus subjective documentation in historical accounts, typically 
photographs hold more authority in the reader or viewer’s mind.  Here, however, the truth-
value judgments are complicated when a traditionally authoritative documentation is subjected 
to an artist’s own renderings.  Does the reader accept the drawn photographs as true just as he 
would real photographs? 
             Figure 14 
 
Certainly these two types of documentation, though carefully related, are vastly 
different and are thus cognized in different terms.  While objective documentation is virtually 
always accepted at face value and subjective representation is virtually always recognized as an 
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affectation, the amalgamation of the two push the boundaries of the viewer’s truth judgments. 
Subjective representations of objective documentation require the viewer to process both fact 
and representation simultaneously, inevitably conflating the two.  It then produces a new level 
of cognitive comprehension somewhere between fact and representation, what I call rendered 
fact.  This mid-level of acquired knowledge allows the viewer to accept the image at face value, 
but also keeps him active in cognitively completing the process on his own.  As Hillary Chute 
writes, “Graphic narrative suggests that historical accuracy is not the opposite of creative 
invention; the problematic of what we consider fact and fiction are made apparent by the role 
of drawing.”41
 Active involvement in the story is integral in attaining and retaining knowledge.  The 
conjunct theories of “knowledge as memory” and “memory as storytelling” described by Schank 
and Abelson (and separately by Turner) offer evidence in support of this.  Theirs is a three-part 
argument.  First, memory is defined as the cognitive storage of events, perceptions, or semantic 
concepts in narrative form.  Second, knowledge is gained by successful memory retrieval of the 
narrative.  Third, successful understanding of knowledge requires that one adopt the memory 
and be able to “retell” the story.
  This is particularly true in the case of conflated objective and subjective images in 
rendered fact. 
42  By fusing the reader’s memory with her own in rendered 
fact, Satrapi is facilitating the successful understanding of her own memories.  She is 
transferring her knowledge to the reader.  Rather poignantly, Satrapi echoes her Uncle’s own 
charge to her as a young girl, “I tell you all this because it’s important that you know.  Our family 
memory must not be lost, even if it’s not easy for you, even if you don’t understand it all.”  Marji 
responds, “Don’t worry, I’ll never forget.”43  And so she retells the story for us, solidifying it in 
her memory and passing the challenge on to us to do the same.   
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C H A P T E R  4  
 
“ S i t t i n g  b e t w e e n  t w o  c h a i r s ”  
 
C o n c e p t u a l  B l e n d  o f  I d e n t i t y  
i n  P e r s e p o l i s  
 
 
 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
The feeling I am evoking [in the second half of Persepolis]… is more a problem of 
when you are going to a new culture and you absolutely want to adapt yourself, 
and you absolutely want to be integrated….  [C]ulture takes all of the space 
inside you.  If you want to have another culture come into you, it’s like you have 
to take out the first one, and then choose what you want from the two and 
swallow them again.1
 
 
 Marjane Satrapi has struggled with her identity and fought the conventional definitions 
in the process.  Living with one foot in Iran, the other in France, she finds it difficult living as a 
cultural production of both, describing the process as a crude form of regurgitation—an 
unpleasant but necessary life-function for those lucky few.  This chapter will elucidate how 
Turner and Fauconnier’s theory of the conceptual blend explains self-understood notions of 
identity and will apply it to Marjane Satrapi’s experienced blend of her Eastern and Western 
identities.  It will further introduce the concept of material and cultural anchors which stabilize 
conceptual blends.  Persepolis is a unique project because it acts as a material anchor for 
Marjane Satrapi’s lived experience in the conceptual blend of identity.  The material form and 
aesthetic style of Persepolis will be analyzed in order to demonstrate how it functions as a 
material anchor for Satrapi’s conceptual blend of identity.  Furthermore, the cartooning 
technique of Ligna Claire acts as a cultural anchor for the reader experiencing the conceptual 
blend, which ultimately elicits reader sympathy and participation in the “rendered fact,” as 
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described in Chapter 3.  The project of Persepolis as a culturally-coherent material object—the 
book, itself—in the modern world is used as a cognitive tool to accomplish Satrapi’s two-fold 
goal to understand herself and to help the Western reader understand Iran. 
 
C O N C E P T U A L  B L E N D  I N  I D E N T I T Y  
 
 The basic theory of conceptual blending was explained in Chapter 2 in relation to 
metaphor and the cross-modal blend of the convergent experience.  However, conceptual 
blending theory was designed to cover the entire range of human cognition in the conceptual 
integration network, a vast array of interconnected conceptual blends from simple one-to-one 
correspondence in basic blends to compounded “megablends.”  Fauconnier and Turner claim 
that conceptual blending is not just “something we do in addition to living in the world; it is our 
means of living in the world.”2  The whole of knowledge acquisition and creative production in 
human cognition can be attributed to the constitutive and governing principles of conceptual 
blending.  Fauconnier and Turner call this “the story of human beings”3 who use blending to 
understand everything “from weaponry to ideology, language to science, art to religion, fantasy 
to mathematics,”4 and especially identity.  Popular psychology places great emphasis on “finding 
out ‘who you are,’ discovering your real self;”5 autobiography is often an assay to establish a 
self-understood identity.  In a conceptual integration network, this consists of mapping one’s 
self onto generic spaces for character like the Vain Man, the Social Climber, or the Good 
Samaritan6
The key to the conceptual blend of identity is how the blend relates frames to 
characters.  A frame is a set of features derived from long-term schematic knowledge, such as 
the frame of buy-sell which includes features such as purchasing agent, selling agent, and 
transaction.  A character, on the other hand, is less restricted to defined sets of features; 
—or, for Marjane Satrapi, the Iranian and the Westerner. 
 C o n c e p t u a l  B l e n d  o f  I d e n t i t y  | 65 
instead, character refers to “a rich knowledge of [the character’s] behavior over many different 
scenarios, including [the character’s] personal style and manner of action and the feelings [the 
character] had in [given] situations.”7  However, in some cases the frame and character are not 
easily distinguished or differentiated. In Persepolis, some of the conceptual blends require that 
the frames act also as character, or vice versa.  For our purposes, I will refer to these as 
character-frames.  Turner and Fauconnier admit that in this “folk theory”8
In the folk theory, frames and characters are interlocking aspects of human 
reality.  You can’t have one without the other, although in some cases the 
emphasis falls more on character and in other cases it falls more on the frame.  
What makes all this slippery is that character is in principle all the behaviors in 
all possible frames, but frames themselves may be just as substantially linked to 
characters.
 of the conceptual 
blend of identity the distinction is blurred when the blend is removed from the vacuum of the 
theoretical world and plunges into reality: 
9
 
 
To clarify a single frame, the conceptual blend would be filled with different essential 
characters.  To clarify an essential character, it would be transported across different frames.  
For example, the frame of buy-sell remains the same regardless of who participates; the 
character Vain Man remains the same regardless of his cultural, geographic, political, or 
immediate situation.10
 
  Turner and Fauconnier summarize the general principle: “...we use 
character to converge on an understanding of frames and we use frames to converge on an 
understanding of character.”  Additionally, character can relate to other character in “If I were 
you...” type blends.  The details of each of these blends and how they apply to Persepolis will be 
discussed further below.  For now, it is important to be aware of the complexities of the 
conceptual blend of identity because these complexities often have far-reaching emotional and 
cognitive consequences. 
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L I V I N G  T H E  C O N C E P T U A L  B L E N D  
 
 What Fauconnier and Turner fail to adequately address in their treatment of conceptual 
integration networks is an inherent tension involved in blending.  Blends are variable and can be 
unpredictable.  Think of a time you were caught off-guard at the unexpected cognitive 
consequences of a metaphor; if for example someone says to you, “Go ahead, take the plunge,” 
and you imagine first jumping from a diving board and then leaping from the Empire State 
Building, then you might feel the tension from the target and source coming together in the 
unexpected product of the blend.  This inconsistency in conceptual blending is described 
formally: “Sometimes two counterparts are projected, sometimes only one, sometimes none; 
sometimes counterparts in the input spaces are fused in the blend, but often not, sometimes an 
element in one input without a counterpart in the other gets projected to the blend,”11
 The tensions involved in conceptual blends of identity are particularly straining because 
of the fact that identity is a thoroughly lived human experience.  The deep existential 
connection one has to one’s own identity makes the conceptual blend very personal.  One has 
to live the conceptual blend; the tensions are thus aggravated.  Marjane Satrapi has been noted 
to have a particularly difficult time with the tensions in her blend of identity.  She is confronted 
with multiple frames of the inputs Eastern and Western and must sift through them to create 
the emergent structure of her identity which is neither one input nor the other.  She sits 
somewhere in between in the emergent structure of the blend.  In an interview she famously 
comments, 
 and so 
on. 
I always say, for me, when people ask, “How do you feel, more French?  More 
Iranian?”  I say, “I’m sitting between two chairs.  It’s not very comfortable, it’s 
true, but when I want to lie down I can because I have two chairs.  Everybody 
else has one chair, they are comfortably seated, but they cannot lie down.”12
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The discomfort she feels is the tension between the generic character-frames “French” and 
“Iranian” that are blending into her.  These only act as inputs onto which she can map herself 
and find her self-understood identity in the blend.  However, she does understand that it places 
her in a unique position as a blended figure; in another interview she claims that she “belongs 
nowhere and… everywhere at the same time.”13
 
  She belongs to none of the character-frames 
exclusively, yet her blend of the character-frames—with elements from each arising in the 
emergent blend—allow her to belong to both simultaneously. 
A .  A N C H O R I N G  C O M P L E X  B L E N D S  
The tensions are fiercely present in her life not only because of the personal attachment 
to the blend but also because of its complexity.  Whenever multiple inputs come together in any 
conceptual blend—and according to Fauconnier and Turner, they do so in every instant of 
cognition—the blend is not only variable but can also be unstable.  This is called conceptual 
instability, as proffered by cognitive scientist Edwin Hutchins.14
The complexity of the manipulations of structure can be increased if the stability 
of the representations can be increased.  The stability of the representations is a 
necessary feature of the reasoning process, but it is often taken for granted.
  He writes, 
15
 
 
Hutchins suggests that human beings solve the problem of conceptual stability by introducing 
anchors to conceptual integration networks.   
Conceptual stability can be achieved by employing cultural or material anchors.  In the 
1960s and 70s, cognitive scientists discovered a general cognitive premise: for most people, 
reasoning—a blending task which requires understanding causal relationships and logical 
sequences—must be mediated by culturally coherent elements.  Hutchins explains, “…unless x 
and y are associated with particular known concepts, our culture has nothing in particular to say 
about the relationship between x and y.”16  In this study, the use of abstractions x and y during 
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the reasoning tasks removed all cultural markers, which resulted in subjects having difficulty 
drawing correct inferences.  However, as soon as culturally coherent models were mapped onto 
the reasoning tasks—“If x, then y” becomes “If this is a garnet, then it is a semi-precious 
stone”—subjects were able to draw correct inferences.  The cultural anchor was the concept of 
garnet and semi-precious stones.  Note that it is not the actual presence of the garnet that 
anchored the blend, but merely the concept.  This is what differentiates cultural anchors from 
material anchors. 
A material anchor provides material structure to a conceptual blend.  The key is that the 
material anchor actually acts as a material representation of the conceptual blend.  Hutchins 
defines the material anchor’s role as a proxy: “If conceptual elements are mapped onto a 
material pattern in such a way that the perceived relationships among the material elements are 
taken as proxies (consciously or unconsciously) for relationships among conceptual elements, 
then the material pattern is acting as a material anchor.”17  For example, writing stands as a 
material anchor for speech; a watch is a material anchor for time.  In fact, anchors can manifest 
as anything that can be manipulated as a prompt for constructing meaning, including gestures 
and facial expressions.18
 
  The cultural and material anchors are crucial for constructing the 
various conceptual blends of identity in Persepolis. 
C O N C E P T U A L  B L E N D I N G  O F  I D E N T I T Y  I N  P E R S E P O L I S  
 
Persepolis has two explicit conceptual blends of identity based on the two-fold goal of 
Marjane Satrapi’s project: to understand her own identity and to help the reader understand 
the Iranian cultural situation.  These goals correlate to the character-frame structure described 
above.  There is a distinction between a character transporting across different frames to locate 
the shared generic (Character-across-Frames blend) and a frame transporting across different 
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characters to locate the shared generic (Frame-across-Characters blend).  The characters 
involved in the conceptual blends in Persepolis include the Modern Iranian, the Western Reader, 
and Marjane Satrapi as she is self-understood.  The frames involved include more standard 
schematic frames like coming-of-age, tyranny, and living through crisis; additionally, there are 
some frames which appear to act more like characters but are frames in one context of blending 
and characters in another—the character-frames, as defined earlier.  These are the Persian, the 
Islamic, the Modern Iranian, the Westerner, and Marjane Satrapi, herself.  The Character-across-
Frames blend cognizes Satrapi’s self-understood identity, whereas the Frame-across-Characters 
blend cognizes the Reader’s understanding of the Modern Iranian cultural situation.  Each blend 
manifests itself in a material and/or cultural anchor: the book itself and the aesthetic form the 
book takes.  The second blend acts as an intermediary to a third implied blend: the Character-to-
Character blend—the “If I were you…” blend.  One of the major goals of Satrapi’s project is to 
get the Western reader to identify and sympathize with the Iranian.  Although the Character-to-
Character blend is not explicitly presented, the Frame-across-Character blend is physically 
present in Persepolis to act as an intermediary to the final Character-to-Character blend. 
 
C H A R A C T E R - A C R O S S - F R A M E S  
 
The Character-across-Frames blend is actually a megablend of identity composed of two 
interlocking, separate blends of identity.  The purpose is to understand the target Character 
(Marjane Satrapi) by transporting it across different frames, which in this case happen to be 
character-frames: Modern Iranian, Westerner, and Self.  The Modern Iranian blend is a separate, 
subordinate blend to Marjane Satrapi’s identity.  It is a blend relating Ancient Persian character 
and the Islamic character, which was explicitly present in Iranian culture at the inception of the 
Islamic state during Ayatollah Khomeini’s reign after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.19  Marjane 
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Satrapi’s self-understood identity is a blend of the character-frames Modern Iranian (1978-
1994), Westerner, and Self.  There is a distinction between her Self and her self-understood 
identity: her Self is the objective set of characteristics that makes up her identity (an input in the 
blend), whereas her self-understood identity is the result of the conceptual blend of Self with 
the separate character inputs.  Figure 15 illustrates the conceptual blend of the Modern Iranian 
and Figure 16 illustrates the megablend, which includes the subordinate blend of the Modern 
Iranian. 
The complexity of the blend is obvious, and Satrapi herself has commented on its 
conceptual instability, if not in those terms.  Thus, it requires a material anchor to stabilize the 
blend.  The material anchor for self-understood identity is the autobiography, itself—the book 
Persepolis.  Marjane Satrapi understood this in some manner when she commented on being 
asked about her identity: 
Well, today I just say “I am Iranian,” and they say “You are Iranian?” and I say 
“Yes it is a fact, I am Iranian.  I was born there, I have black hair.  Yes, I am an 
Iranian person, what can I do?” Since writing the book, nobody can tell me “Give 
me some explanation.”  I think now my explanation is just, “Read the book and 
you’ll see.”20
 
 
The reader understands the project of autobiography as a presentation of the author’s self.  For 
us and for her, it is an immediate proxy for the conceptual blend of her identity which, according 
to Hutchins, meets the criteria for a material anchor.  The multi-modal characteristic of the 
medium—the fact that it is a graphic novel and not any other kind of novel—is a necessary 
material element for the anchor because it also balances the tension between two material 
representations of a blend—writing or text (the material anchor for speech) and image (the 
material anchor for a variety of non-verbal experiences).  For Satrapi, it mimics her bi-
existentiality as both one Character and another Character, a bi-existentiality whose tensions  
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Input 1A: 
ISLAMIC 
Input 2A: 
PERSIAN 
Generic 
Space A 
Target A: 
Modern Iranian 
(1978-1994) 
Connections between inputs 
and generic and blended spaces 
 
Cross-space mapping to counterpart 
connections in inputs 
 
 
Key 
 
Figure 15 - The conceptual blend of the Modern Iranian.  The target of this blend will become a source for Marjane Satrapi’s 
megablend of identity. 
Input 1A: 
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Input 2A: 
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Space A 
Input 1B: 
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WESTERNER 
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Space B 
Target B: 
Marjane Satrapi’s 
Self-understood 
identity 
Material Anchor 
Figure 15 - The megablend of Marjane Satrapi's self-understood identity, with a marker for the material anchor. 
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often marginalize her just as the tensions of text-image often marginalize the cartoonist.  She 
says, 
We [cartoonists] all the time have to justify ourselves.  There are people who 
like to write or like to draw.  We are a little bit like the bisexual of the culture.  
People don’t have any problem if you are a heterosexual or a homosexual, but if 
you like both men and women, that becomes a problem.  We’re like that.  We 
like to write and we like to draw and we cannot choose between the two.  So I 
guess I’m a cultural bisexual!21
 
 
The elements of the conceptual blend of identity, then, will manifest themselves in the style of 
the graphic narrative.  The following sections analyze the elements of the blend through the 
material anchor of the aesthetic style of the graphic narrative.  The Target—Marjane Satrapi’s 
self-understood identity—whose material anchor is the graphic novel Persepolis will then show 
elements of each of its inputs—the Islamic, the Persian, the Western, the Self—to produce a 
unique blend.  Each of the sources will be discussed individually with the exception of Satrapi’s 
objective Self character-frame which is the primary source of the conceptual blend.  The 
elements discussed below are to be understood as elements which have cross-mapped onto 
Satrapi’s Self character-frame, as elements that they share. 
 
A .  S O U R C E  1 A :  I S L A M I C  C H A R A C T E R - F R A M E  
The Islamic character-frame is the most at odds with the other character frames both 
conceptually and materially.  With the establishment of the Islamic state and a backlash from 
the Iranian Revolution, Iran became a country with new strictures on freedoms, all claiming a 
basis in religion.  The political and cultural imposition of an Islamic identity on the Iranian nation 
usurped also Marjane Satrapi’s own identity.  In Persepolis, Marji attempts to make sense of this 
blend when she was suddenly forced to don the veil, for example.  In one panel (Figure 16), she 
says “I really didn’t know what to think about the veil, deep down I was very religious but as a 
family we were modern and avant-garde.”22  This one panel is a conglomerate of three major 
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elements that the Islamic character-frame brings to the material anchor: iconoclasm, 
reprobation of figural representation, and abstract decoration. 
        Figure 16 
 
Islamic iconoclasm is not based in Qur’anic scripture—a common misconception—but is 
actually based on various Traditions of the Prophet, the Hadith. The fear is that the image does 
not only represent its subject, but can actually function as if it were the thing, itself.23  This is 
called a fear of shirk, “a term that came to mean polytheism and idolatry but originally meant 
associating other gods with God.”24  A fear of shirk is closely tied to a fear of “usurping divine 
creative powers.”25  An image is a false artifice which can be cognitively misconstrued as reality.  
Thus, the power artists have is akin to God or Allah as Creator—one who can create form and 
life from nothing.  In fact, Satrapi has admitted that her creations gave her the power of the 
divine: “I feel like God, you know, God created the man and said, ‘Stand up and walk.’ I drew 
that.”26  To protect against this kind of blasphemy, Muslims informally practiced the now 
infamous Defacement of images—a mutilation of the affective parts of the face, such as the 
eyes and nose, a substitute for decapitation.  It was a way to “deanimate” the images, deprive 
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them of a soul.  Flood takes note of the unique relationship Muslim iconoclasts have with 
images, then—one in which their material backlash implicitly legitimizes the image: 
If we are to believe recent anthropological and art historical scholarship on 
iconoclasm, the “confusion” of signifier and signified noted here arises from a 
universal tendency to invest the image with the capacity for animation to 
varying degrees.  Visiting vengeance or shame on the image as if on the body of 
a living person, iconoclasts engage with the image as if it were animate.27
 
 
Additional manifestations of Islamic iconoclasm included the forbiddance of representations 
with shadows, whose defacement was not only recommended by the good-faith Muslim but, 
indeed, obligatory.28
 Reprobation of figural representations is closely tied to the principles of Islamic 
iconoclasm, but it also comes through in the general virtue of modesty for the human body, the 
female human body in particular.  Muslims point to the Quar’anic verse in Surah 33:59 which 
says, “O Prophet [Muhammad]!  Tell / Thy wives and daughters / And the believing women, / 
That they should cast / Their outer garments over / Their persons (when abroad): / That is most 
convenient, / That they should be known / (As such) and not molested.”
  This feature is dramatically present in Persepolis.  Although Satrapi defies 
the general Islamic iconoclasm, finding it necessary to give a face to her characters, she does 
follow this simple premise.  Her drawings are simple and one-dimensional, with well-defined 
lines to restrict herself to the boundaries of artistic representation, to spurn the shades of 
reality. 
29
You have to be able to know the movement, you have to know the anatomy of 
the human being.  In my first art courses in university our model was covered, 
so you know we knew very well how to draw the tissue or the nose or the face, 
but the rest I didn’t know it.
  The veil (hijab) or the 
full-length chedor was then mandated for Iranian women under the Islamic regime of Ayatollah 
Khomeini.  This was problematic for Marjane Satrapi not only politically but practically, as well.  
As an art student in Iran, she was forbidden to learn the human form.  She noted of her 
experience, 
30 
 C o n c e p t u a l  B l e n d  o f  I d e n t i t y  | 75 
 
The simplicity of her figural representations in Persepolis thus came out of necessity.  Whether 
or not figural representation was rebuked philosophically in Islamic tradition, Satrapi still faced a 
practical issue with human form.  She was never taught to draw the human body because the 
human body was always clothed, mediated by modesty and religion. 
The Islamic character-frame was not entirely negative and was not a detriment to the 
blend.  Satrapi claims that she “was clever enough to take [her] lack and make a style out of 
it.”31
The Islamic character-frame does more than just add simplicity to the images; it also 
takes advantage of the traditional use of abstraction, an alternative form of artistic 
representation to figural representation.  Decorative themes, in fact, became a hallmark of 
Islamic art due, in part, to the rejection of figural representation.  One historian notes that 
“Europeans coined the term arabesque [to describe] when Renaissance artists incorporated 
Islamic designs in book ornament and decorative bookbindings.”
  Thematically, the simple drawings register as childlike, which is perfect for a coming-of-
age story told by wide-eyed Marji.  We will see later how the simple aesthetic of her cartooning 
style as an authorial choice—not only as a practical necessity—further affects the conceptual 
blend for the reader. 
32
What is particularly interesting about the Islamic character-frame is not only what 
elements are incorporated into the blend, but which elements are not.  Islamic art, both 
traditional (Figure 17, 18) and modern (Figure 19, 20),
  In the panel mentioned 
above which visualizes the blend of the Islamic character-frame, arabesque decorates the right 
side of the panel.  The additional detail adds beauty to the negative imposition of the veil on 
young Marji, emphasizing the benefits and detriments of the Islamic character-frame as an input 
to her identity. 
33 is praised for its vibrant and exuberant 
use of color in addition to abstraction.34   Why then does Marjane Satrapi prefer the stark  
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     Figure 17 – An illustrated manuscript of the Qu’ran (ca. 1398).35
 
 
 
     Figure 18 – A calligraphic drawing from Islamic Turkey (ca. 1890).36
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Figure 19 – A kasab (ca. 1941) prominently featuring arabesque. 
 
 
Figure 20 – The Night that is More Perfect than 1,000 Months (ca. 1990s) by Yayasan Serambi Pirous, based on 
Qur’anic revelation. 
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contrast of black and white when she could have taken advantage of the rich chromatic options 
available in the Islamic character-frame?  This is where the mapping of Islamic elements onto 
her self-understood identity stops manifesting itself and where her Persian character-frame 
begins. 
 
B .  S O U R C E  2 A :  P E R S I A N  C H A R A C T E R - F R A M E  
The Ancient Persian character-frame provides Marjane Satrapi with a nostalgic element 
of ancestral pride.  For her, her identity cannot be extricated from the generations of Iranians 
before her.  Indeed the focus of all of her graphic narratives to date trace Iranian history from 
the 70s to the 90s (Persepolis), 50s to the 70s (Chicken with Plums) and from generation to 
generation with herself (Persepolis), her uncle (Chicken with Plums), and her grandmother 
(Embroideries).  She has said before that her goal is to trace Iranian history back even further.37  
In Persepolis, she begins the novel by privileging the reader with a brief history lesson38 to pay 
homage to the cultural development of her ancestors and the Persian identity.  Persepolis then 
concludes with a creative attempt to return to an ancient Persian identity as she and her 
husband (at the time) collaborated to develop “the equivalent of Disneyland in Tehran”39 (Figure 
21), a theme park based on Persian mythological heroes.  The project was well-received in 
academic circles, but when Marjane approached the Mayor’s Deputy to implement her plans, 
she was swiftly denied.  The Mayor’s Deputy explained that this project was impossible; for one, 
many of the mythological characters, like a Gord Afarid—a female warrior—were women 
without veils.  When Marjane suggested they cover them, the Deputy responded, “A Gord Afarid 
in a chador is no longer a Gord Afraid.  You know that as well as I do!  I’m going to be frank with 
you: the government couldn’t care less about mythology.  What they want are religious symbols.  
Your project is certainly interesting, but it’s unachievable!”40  The Islamic regime had stifled that 
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to which she desperately 
wanted to return.  Persepolis as 
a conceptual and material 
product, then, actively blends 
elements of the Persian 
character-frame to thwart the 
imposition of the Islamic 
regime on her cultural heritage.  
Persepolis is Satrapi’s second 
chance at accomplishing what 
she could not in the Mayor 
Deputy’s office: to restore the 
authority of her Persian 
identity. 
As opposed to the 
Islamic character-frame which was iconoclastic, the Persian character-frame displays elements 
of iconotropism—or a hunger for images.  Ellen Spolsky defines iconotropism in a cultural 
group—or in our case, a character-frame—as “the combination of the culturally produced and 
valued icon with the automatic or reactive notion of tropism (as in phototropism, when a flower 
turns toward the sun)…”41  Persian art flourished for centuries not only because of their 
acknowledgement of artistic representation and image, but truly because they clung to it, 
collected it, preserved it, and loaded pages, vases, walls, buildings, jewelry with it.  Art historian 
David J. Roxburgh has performed an exhaustive study on Persian albums, bound collections of 
calligraphy, painting, and drawing assembled in Greater Iran between ca. 1400 and 1600.42  The 
Figure 21 
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extraordinary detail with which Persians catalogued and preserved text and image is evidence of 
Spolsky’s notion of tropism. 
Literary critics who compare Satrapi’s style to ancient Persian art usually do so in the 
context of Persian miniatures,43 but there is perhaps an even stronger relationship between 
Satrapi’s work and Persian lithography which has yet to be acknowledged.  First, lithography is a 
process of reproducing hand-drawn images.  A Persian lithographer would create the original on 
a specially prepared paper with “transfer ink” depicting the image.  Marzolph notes that this is a 
process unique to Persian lithographers.  He writes, “The paper copy was then used to print a 
single reverse master copy onto the lithographic stone from which—after specified chemical 
treatment—the printing of multiple copes on paper was achieved.”44
Lithographed books in the Persian tradition are almost exact cultural mirrors of today’s 
graphic narrative in material form.  Though illustration in Persian lithographed books was 
employed for a variety of purposes—from scientific books and school manuals, to travel 
accounts, historical studies, and translations of European literature
  Variations on lithographic 
processes included a direct etching on to the stone, itself.  Ink was applied and mass copies were 
printed.  The result was an illustrated narrative with defined panels for images, printed in stark 
black and white.  It is out of this tradition that Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis arises.  Indeed, even 
her style mimics the style of Persian lithographers with their attention to symmetry, collective 
identities (as explained in Chapter 1), and exclusive alternation between profile and frontal 
perspectives of the body. 
45—the narrative illustration 
acted as a natural counterpart to realistic depiction, just as cartooning does in the modern 
graphic narrative.  Furthermore, lithographed books were mass-produced  and a phenomenon 
of pop culture, which made them “unlike illustrated manuscripts… a little closer to the people,” 
granting them a “social aspect” which linked them not to the Ideal Persian but the Real Persian 
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Figure 22 - A lithograph from Tufaan al-bokaa (ca. 1855) is characteristic of Persian lithography.  Compare to Figure 
6 above from Persepolis to note the striking similarities of aesthetic.46
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Figure 23 – Artist Mirzaa ‘Ali-Qoli khu’i developed a lithographed narrative, structured by panels, about the 
opposition of beauty (youth) and ugliness (old age).47
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Figures 24 and 25 - Compare an example from Hamle-ye Heidariye (ca. 1847)48
 
 (below) to Satrapi's representation 
of family history and historical identity (far below). 
 
Figure 25 
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 of historical actuality.49  The success of lithography was due in part to the socio-cultural nature 
of hand-written text, as well.  Just as the author’s material hand is seen in the text of graphic 
narrative, so too is the Persian lithographer’s.  Persians preferred hand-written calligraphy over 
printing in types, “the characters being necessarily stiff and uncouth and very displeasing to an 
eye accustomed to the flowing hand.”50
 
  Marjane Satrapi follows in the Persian lithographer’s 
lead from material form—a cultural equivalent to the graphic narrative—to aesthetic style. 
C .  S O U R C E  2 B :  W E S T E R N E R  C H A R A C T E R - F R A M E  
Modern Western culture is notorious for being iconotropic, being driven by images in 
every moment of our over-digitized world of hyper-media.  Cultural theorist William Nericcio 
has gone so far as to invoke “war” on the metaphorical matrix of our image-laden world, which 
leaves language to fall by the wayside.  He claims there is a “’contamination’ of word by image.  
In this scenario, picture an innocent, isolated, pristine alphabet infected with virulent visual 
elements born from, borne by infection, digitized image-laden bodies.”51
 
  It is out of this 
demand for image that the graphic narrative flourishes.  (Spolsky, of course, rejoices and 
embraces our iconotropic nature, and would do the same for the graphic narrative.)  It is—in the 
form we know it today—a Western cultural product, garnering increasingly more and more 
respect in the literary community.  This is where Satrapi’s material anchor gets its form.  Though 
the blend of the Modern Iranian identity incites tensions between the iconoclastic Islamic 
character-frame and the iconotropic Persian character-frame, the Western character-frame 
privileges iconotropism and legitimizes the form of the graphic narrative as a material anchor for 
a conceptual blend. 
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F R A M E - A C R O S S - C H A R A C T E R S  
 
 The Frame-across-Characters blend transports a frame across characters to find the 
common elements and better understand the frame.  In Persepolis, the frames in this type of 
blend include schematic frames of coming-of-age, tyranny, and facing crisis, for example.  
Satrapi’s goal is to show that these frames are not limited to Arab countries or—generally 
speaking—the Eastern Other.  She uses this as an intermediary blend which forces the reader to 
participate in the blend as one of the characters.  Thus the characters in each Frame-across-
Character blend are Marjane Satrapi (directly), the Modern Iranian (indirectly), and the Western 
Reader.  The Modern Iranian is filtered through Marjane Satrapi’s character as part of her own 
character blend.  In the process of the Frame-across-Characters blend, the reader is thus 
mapped onto Marjane Satrapi and the Modern Iranian to better understand schematic frames 
which are naturally a part of the human—not just Iranian—condition.  The anchor for this type 
of blend is both material and cultural.  Marjane Satrapi’s choice of aesthetic, Ligna Claire, elicits 
reader sympathy and participation in the “rendered fact” described in Chapter 3. 
 Satrapi’s use of the European Ligna Claire (Clear Line) tradition of cartooning, which 
“privileges smooth, continuous linework, simplified contours and… solid colors, while avoiding 
frayed lines, exploded forms, and expressionistic rendering,”52 functions in a few ways.  First, it 
was a pragmatic choice: “… the story was very complicated so I couldn’t have a very complicated 
drawing because it would have been too much.  I [Satrapi] had to purify the style of the drawing 
as much as possible.”53  The simplicity of the image focused less on the details of visual 
cognition and more on the experience of the pictured image.  It was essential that this happen 
in the visual modality as opposed to the verbal: “…words also are filters.  They have to be 
translated,” Satrapi said.  “Even in the original language, there is interpretation and ambiguity.  
If there’s a cultural difference between the writer and the reader, that might come out in words.  
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But with pictures, there’s more efficiency.”54  This is because of the basic elements given in the 
Clara Ligne cartoon—the basic face, the basic body, the basic representation of emotion.  For 
Satrapi, this simplification or “abstraction of the drawing” is something “everyone can relate 
to.”55
In this stage of the conceptual blending of identity, the Characters have not been asked 
to map themselves onto the other.  They can sympathize—or match element to element, 
emotion to emotion—but they cannot empathize. “…sympathy as an imaginative capacity that 
can bridge divisions between people of different backgrounds.”
  We are reminded of Hutchins’ claim that a blend must be culturally coherent to be stable.  
The simplicity of Clara Ligne makes it a suitable cultural anchor, allowing for the cross-spatial 
mapping from Character to Character.  Note, however, that the character mappings are cross-
spatial, they are not being mapped from input to target.  The target element is the schematic 
frame.  Clara Ligne has facilitated the cross-spatial mapping to better understand schematic 
frames of the human condition. 
56  Sympathy may take the form 
of concern, sorrow, outrage, caring; sympathy allows one character to connect with another 
character, but not become that character.  Empathy is what transfers the power of one 
character into the other.  Marjane Satrapi believes that the biggest problem in our world today 
is “that there’s no empathy.  Nobody puts themselves in the place of others.  Everyone thinks 
they are the only one to suffer.”57
 
  The final step in the conceptual blend of identity in Persepolis 
requires empathy—requires the reader to participate in rendered fact. 
C H A R A C T E R - T O - C H A R A C T E R  
  
To better understand how character can relate to character in the conceptual blend of 
identity, I turn to Turner and Fauconnier’s example of the Debate with Kant in which a modern 
philosopher fuses himself with Kant by asking the question, “If I were Kant…?”: 
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The modern philosopher uses her knowledge of Kant’s character and identity, 
and her own intellectual character, tastes, and interests, in order to run the 
blend—that is, to “become” Kant in some respects as she approaches the 
problem.  Whether her imitation of Kant is objectively accurate is beside the 
point; what matters is whether the blended character she imagines and 
“becomes” is intellectually productive.  Remarkably, she can get new insight, 
have a different cast of mind, acquire new capacities to an extent as she 
inhabits this blend, and thus makes discoveries that were otherwise unavailable 
to her.58
 
 
Marjane Satrapi wants the Western Reader to ask themselves the question, “If I were Marjane 
Satrapi… If I were Iranian, what would I do?”  The characters have been given their cultural 
anchor of Clara Ligne and have facilitated a cross-spatial mapping between the two characters.  
Now, it is time for the two to be understood in terms of the other.  Clara Ligne, with minimal 
detail and simple faces, forces the Western Reader to fill in the gaps, so to speak, of the reality 
left unrendered.  He is given a part of a blend which he must complete himself.  In the 
artistically rendered photographs (Figure 14),59 the faces and scenes are minimalistic, asking the 
reader to cognitively add his own details to the rendered images.  He thus blends his Character 
with the Character of the Modern Iranian.  What was once an external documentation of 
reality—an external imposition of memory and knowledge—transforms into a personal 
experience.  The photographs are no longer semantic memory, offered by the author, but 
something similar to episodic memory, experienced and completed by the reader.  The rendered 
fact thus allows the Western Reader to map himself onto the Modern Iranian in Persepolis.  
Through empathy, through the conceptual blend of character-to-character, and finally through 
the cultural and material anchor of Clara Ligne, the Western Reader can blend himself with the 
Iranian and “become” a new character.  He is the emergent content of the character-to-
character blend of identity with a newly cultured “cast of mind… [which] thus makes discoveries 
that where otherwise unavailable to [him].” 
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C H A P T E R  5  
 
“ T h e  h e r i t a g e  o f  a l l  h u m a n  
b e i n g s ”  
 
C o n c l u s i o n  
 
 
 
 
T H I N K I N G  I N  T E X T  A N D  I M A G E  
 
For Marjane Satrapi, the reason for writing Persepolis in the graphic narrative medium 
was clear: “No, it’s not that [I was a cartoonist and was looking for a story to tell or that the 
graphic storytelling and comic-strip style was an appropriate way to tell my story].  It’s that I 
have a brain that functions with text and images so this is it.”1  For Satrapi, each of her 
experiences equally deserves both visual and verbal narrative trajectories.  This is even more 
significant because it suggests that the author—whose elicit formational experiences are 
present in each visual and verbal moment of Persepolis—must process all of her life experiences 
as both text and image.  The emphasis seems to be on those formational experiences; 
something in her development seemed to trigger a need for text-image integration.  One could 
posit that thinking in text and image is unique to Marjane Satrapi because of her development 
as a transnational, living with both Iranian and Western identities compressed inside of her.  A 
dually processed identity would relate to dual-processing cognitive structure (in the verbal and 
nonverbal modalities) which in turn would relate to a dually coded narrative (in the graphic 
narrative).  But Marjane Satrapi is not unique in this way.  The cognitive development of every 
human being begins and ends in the conceptual integration network.  Every human being must 
process and live the blend.  It is not limited only to those whose blends are made explicit—those 
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whose lives were defined by the juncture of disparate sources like the Eastern and Western.  
Ellen Spolsky, Mark Sadoski, Allan Paivio, and many other literary and cognitive theorists argue 
that all human beings process the world through blends, all human beings process the world 
through the verbal and the nonverbal, and many do so specifically through text and image.   
 This project endeavored to destigmatize both cognitive literary studies and graphic 
narrative studies by analyzing the two discourses discursively.  Through the lens of cognitive 
literary theory, one can explore the ways in which text and image interact in the graphic 
narrative as a medium.  What was once thought of as a crude plebian form of entertainment, 
the graphic narrative can now be understood as an expression of the basic human hunger for 
images.  It illuminates the viability of graphic novels as rich sources for further scholarship.  The 
cognitive implications of language’s silent partner—the image—on a narrative are far-reaching.  
In an autobio-graphic novel, the dual narrative lines created a productive friction and bolstered 
the authenticity of the nonfiction genre.   In Persepolis, itself, the text-image presentation acted 
as material anchor for the conceptual blend of the author’s identity.  It materialized the unseen 
conceptual processes of existential angst.  Beyond all that, it offered the reader the opportunity 
to enter into the narrative and into Marjane Satrapi’s own identity in a unique way.  The reader 
could touch the pages, see the images, hear the words, and ask himself, “If I were her…”  
Persepolis is a project in multimodal processing and conceptual blending that fundamentally 
unites people.  The cognitive juncture of text and image invites her story to become our story, 
her culture to become our culture.  “There is no frontier,” Satrapi says, “Your Edgar Allan Poe 
belongs as much to me as much as my poet in Iran, Hafiz, belongs to you.  That is the heritage of 
all human beings.”2 
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